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As artificial intelligence (AI) developers produce more applications for 
professional use, how will we determine when the use is professionally 
responsible? One way to answer the question is to determine whether the AI 
augments the professional’s intelligence or whether it is used as a substitute 
for it. To augment the professional’s intelligence would be to make it greater, 
that is, to increase and improve the professional’s expertise. But a 
professional who substitutes artificial intelligence for his or her own puts 
both the professional role and the client at risk. The problem is developing 
guidance that encourages professionals to use AI when it can reliably 
improve expertise but discourages substitution that undermines expertise. 
This Article proposes a solution, using tax professionals as a case study. 
There are several reasons tax professionals provide a good case study, 
including that tax practice has a long history of computerization and that AI 
is already being developed for tax professionals. Tax professionals, including 
not only lawyers but certified public accountants, are directly regulated by 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), in addition to their regulation by 
professional bodies.  
This Article proposes a public-private cooperation in regulating the use 
of AI by professionals in ex ante tax planning. On the private side would be 
panels of experts testing new AI applications for reliability by running 
experiments. The panels would certify AI products determined to be 
substantively sound and designed to educate and engage the professional. On 
the public side, the IRS would provide a presumptive defense to professional 
responsibility-related penalties against professionals who used the certified 
AI. This should motivate tax planners to prefer purchasing certified tax 
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planning AI applications, and thereby motivate tax AI application developers 
to seek certification. 
Though this Article’s proposal is specific for the use of AI by tax 
professionals, it illuminates a way forward for regulating AI use by other 
professions. The way would be for third parties such as government agencies, 
professional associations, or malpractice insurers to stimulate demand for 
certified AI products to be used by professionals. In general, these 
certifications should be provided to AI that augments the professional’s 
intelligence, increasing his or her professional competence. By keeping 
professionals involved in the certification process, space is opened to shape 
the transformation AI is bringing to the professions, and by stimulating 
product demand for certified products, the odds of successfully shaping that 
transformation are improved.  
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Our goal is augmenting intelligence. It is man and machine. This 
is all about extending your expertise. A teacher. A doctor. A 
lawyer. It doesn’t matter what you do. We will extend it. 
IBM President and Chief Executive Officer Ginni Rometty 
speaking about IBM’s Watson1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A young mother visited her obstetrician, hoping for help losing weight. 
Her doctor turned to a computer program to determine what should be 
prescribed. The prescription killed the mother. Is this a case of professional 
irresponsibility? Or is it a case of product liability? Who is at fault: the doctor 
or the program developers? The New Jersey courts are deciding.2 
Life-and-death situations magnify the risks of computer use so that we 
easily take interest. But the rewards of doctors using computers should be 
magnified as well so that we can see the bigger picture. Artificial intelligence 
(AI) helps doctors diagnose and treat diseases; indeed, AI is so good at 
detecting facts not noted by human professionals that it can successfully 
predict the occurrence of disease in patients–remarkably, including diseases 
that human professionals cannot predict and do not understand how AI 
predicts.3 The quality of AI judgments in these situations exceeds that of the 
professionals.  
Judgment is the heart of professionalism. The professional has great 
expertise, uncommon experience, and high duties of care to use that 
intelligence in balancing risks and rewards when counseling patients or 
clients. The professional knows more and is obligated to help the patient or 
 
 1. IBM Think Ahead: Soon Watson AI Will Be Behind Every Decision, CYBER SECURITY 
INTELLIGENCE (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.cybersecurityintelligence.com/blog/ibm-think-ahead-
soon-watson-ai-will-be-behind-every-decision-1830.html [https://perma.cc/4ZHN-NJ52]. 
 2. Skounakis v. Sotillo, No. A-2403-15T2, 2018 WL 1370216, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Mar. 19, 2018). See Charles A. Weiss, Malpractice by a Computerized Decision-Support 
Tool?, HOLLAND & KNIGHT HEALTHCARE BLOG (April 2, 2018), 
https://www.hklaw.com/healthblog/malpractice-by-a-computerized-decision-support-tool-04-
02-2018/ [https://perma.cc/4EFH-KJ6A].  
 3. For example, a program called “Deep Patient” uses a massive amount of data to discern 
patterns in order to predict when patients were likely to suffer from a variety of conditions. Will 
Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/ [https://perma. 
cc/E94Q-8SDB]. Neural networks are being used to interpret X-rays. Curtis E.A. Karnow, The 
Opinion of Machines, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV 136, 147 (2017). Deep learning has also 
proven better at detecting diabetic retinopathy better than their human ophthalmologist 
counterparts. Sara Chodosh, Google Is Using Its Deep Learning Tech To Diagnose Disease, 
POPULAR SCI. (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.popsci.com/google-applied-technology-they-use-to-
sort-photos-to-diagnose-diabetic-eye-problems [https://perma.cc/8SA7-LJAN]. 
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client learn more about the problem and the variety of (usually imperfect) 
solutions. 
The ethical issue for a professional relying on a powerful computer 
application is whether it is being used to augment the professional’s 
intelligence, as IBM President and Chief Executive Officer Ginni Rometty 
said about her corporation’s AI programs, or it is being used as a substitute 
for the professional’s intelligence. To augment the professional’s intelligence 
would be to make it greater, that is, to increase and improve the professional’s 
expertise. But a professional who over-relies on AI, who always defers and 
does not second-guess, substitutes artificial intelligence for his or her own.  
The problem is how to develop guidance that encourages professionals to 
use AI when it can reliably improve their expertise but discourages over-
reliance that risks their role as a professional and puts others at even more 
serious risks. This Article proposes a solution. 
The case study of this Article is tax law. There are several reasons the 
practice of tax law makes a good case study. First, it involves a clear public 
good: the funding of government. Tax professionals’ duties run both to the 
client and to the public.4  
Second, tax practice has a long history of computerization, and 
considerable parts of the practice are already wholly computerized.5 
Researchers continue to pursue greater applications, and with the amount of 
money at stake in taxation, it is reasonable to predict the resources and 
incentives will help deliver advanced AI to tax professionals sooner rather 
than later.6  
Third, the practice of federal tax law is interdisciplinary. No single 
profession monopolizes it.7 Several professions share the expertise and 
privileges of practice at all levels.8 Each profession has its own greater 
 
 4. This is usually described as a duty to “the system” and to the client. See, e.g., BERNARD 
WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN & KENNETH L. HARRIS, STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE § 101.2 at 3 
(5th ed. 1999); LINDA GALLER & MICHAEL B. LANG, REGULATION OF TAX PRACTICE 1 (2nd ed. 
2016). Professor Deborah Schenk claims the self-reporting nature of the tax system means that 
the tax system cannot permit the “absolute adversarial” relationship that lawyers might have in 
other situations. Deborah H. Schenk, Tax Ethics, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1995, 2005 (1982) (reviewing 
BERNARD WOLFMAN & JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 
(1981)). 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 55–81. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 88–93. 
 7. Attorneys, certified public accountants (CPAs), enrolled agents, enrolled actuaries, and 
enrolled retirement plan agents may all represent clients in some capacity in front of the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS). 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2019). As discussed below, this includes providing 
written tax advice but, surprisingly to some, does not include preparing tax returns. See infra text 
accompanying notes 94–100. 
 8. Non-attorneys (such as CPAs) who pass an examination will be admitted to practice 
before the Tax Court. TAX CT R. 200(a)(3) (2012). 
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specialization, but they share the practice and routinely work together and 
rely on one another.9 Often the investigation of AI ethics in the practice of 
law devolves into fruitless argument as to where the practice of law ends and 
the unauthorized practice of law begins.10 But, as the practice of federal tax 
law is not limited to lawyers, defining the practice of law is not a distraction. 
Fourth, there is a single and overarching regulator of tax professionals: the 
federal government.11 It has the power to impose financial and criminal 
penalties, and the power to disqualify someone from practice.12 It has unique 
force in professional regulation.13 
Fifth, the body of rules and standards for regulating tax professionals is 
detailed and technical. This allows discussing the professional use of AI in a 
precise and practical way.14 It prevents substituting a discussion of the 
essence of human intelligence or the coming age of our robot overlords for a 
discussion of professional ethics.15 
The greatest potential for AI development is customized business tax 
planning. This is the ex ante work of tax professionals. It is advising clients 
on creating events so as to achieve the client’s non-tax goals in tax efficient 
ways. In contrast is the work of reporting completed events to the government 
 
 9. The National Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants has recognized 
both professions as qualified but have articulated principles that roughly divide the work. NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF LAWYERS AND CPAS, LAWYERS AND CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS: A 
STUDY OF INTERPROFESSIONAL RELATIONS 5–10 (1981). The Conference recognizes that both 
lawyers and CPAs are qualified to determine the probable tax effects of a transactions, but CPAs 
are encouraged to consult lawyers as to the interpretation or application of laws, and lawyers are 
encouraged to consults with CPAs as to describing the transaction in money terms or interpreting 
financial results. Id. at 15. Preparing legal documents is the special expertise of lawyers while 
preparing financial statements and similar reports is the special expertise of CPAs. Id. While both 
lawyers and CPAs are entitled to represent clients in Tax Court, the Conference advises CPAs to 
consult with lawyers when doing so. Id. at 16. 
 10. The practice of law is surprisingly difficult to define. Not surprisingly, the current 
approach to unauthorized practice of law (UPL) rules is not very useful in policing the use of 
computerized applications in this area. Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers? 
Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law, 30 Gᴇᴏ. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 542 (2017). 
 11. See infra text accompanying notes 181–91. 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 181–91. 
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 181–91. 
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 229–43.  
 15. My colleague Ryan Calo wrote, “Some set of readers may feel I have left out a key 
question: does artificial intelligence present an existential threat to humanity? If so, perhaps all 
other discussions constitute the policy equivalent of rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. Why 
fix the human world if AI is going to end it?” Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer 
and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399, 431 (2017). As Calo has pointed out, focusing on the 
more remote risks distracts us from the more immediate ones. I do accept there is some chance 
that AI will end the human world. But I know there is a much greater chance that doctors will kill 
patients through the irresponsible use of AI long before it poses a risk to the entire world. 
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and the work resolving controversies with the government. The ex post 
reporting (i.e., completing and filing forms) has long been computerized (e.g., 
TurboTax), as the tax controversy resolution work has long been practically 
dependent on computerized assistance (e.g., Westlaw and LexisNexis). 
Highly customized tax planning as such, however, is the field with the highest 
harvest potential for computerization.  
In tax planning, the events have yet to occur, and the professional’s advice 
is both creative and predictive. It creates the blueprint for events. It is 
predictive as to the client’s prevailing if a controversy arises after the events 
are completed and reported to the government. The potential is AI gathering 
detailed facts on the client’s operations and goals, and perhaps even to 
continuously gather operating facts in real time, and then detecting patterns 
that are legally relevant and patterns that provide planning opportunities, 
even though those patterns may not have been spotted by the professional. 
This would mimic the human advisor’s role in tax planning: detecting the 
relevant facts and laws, making appropriate assumptions and estimations, 
applying the law, inferring opportunities, and assessing the risks. The product 
in aim would be a well-tailored, legally sustainable tax plan with risks and 
rewards well explained. What this Article considers is the professional 
responsibility of tax professionals using what is, in some sense, their 
technological substitute and that, in some cases, might perform not only as 
well as but better.  
This Article divides its discussion of the professional ethics of AI use by 
tax professionals as follows. The first Part introduces the public importance 
of tax and brings the reader up to date on AI in the practice of law generally 
and the history of computer use in tax law specifically. The second Part 
explains who tax professionals are and what they do and then describes the 
potential use of AI for ex ante business tax planning. Part three explores the 
professional responsibility concerns for professionals using tax planning AI 
and then relates how specific professional responsibility standards illuminate 
the way forward for encouraging professionally appropriate AI use. The 
fourth Part proposes a public–private cooperation to encourage tax 
professionals to use AI that can reliably improve their understanding but 
discourage substituting AI for their own. This involves the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) providing defenses to penalties and professional sanctions for 
professionals that use certified AI (but make mistakes), thereby creating 
product demand for the certification. It is proposed that the IRS would 
authorize panels of private experts to certify tax planning AI, including 
certifying that the AI functions so as to improve the professional’s 
understanding. The Article concludes with a reflection on how this specific 
solution can illuminate the way for other professions to encourage the 
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development and use of AI that improves professional intelligence rather than 
undermining the profession with substitutions for intelligence. 
II. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND 
TAX 
A. AI and the Legal Profession 
Defining AI is difficult.16 And, unlike Justice Potter Stewart’s view of 
illegal obscenity, we probably do not know it when we see it.17 We so quickly 
adapt to technological innovations that we quickly forget how marvelous an 
innovation first seemed and keep looking for something more marvelous to 
come. Our twentieth-century ancestors would marvel at machines that 
 
 16. Merriam-Webster defines AI as “the capability of a machine to imitate intelligent human 
behavior.” Artificial Intelligence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/artificial%20intelligence [https://perma.cc/UE7A-UJZB] (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2019). Dictionary.com defines it as “the capacity of a computer to perform operations 
analogous to learning and decision making in humans.” Artificial Intelligence, DICTIONARY.ᴄᴏᴍ, 
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/artificial-intelligence?s=t [https://perma.cc/REQ4-SESS] 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2019). Similarly, the Oxford Dictionary defines AI as “[t]he theory and 
development of computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence.” 
Artificial Intelligence, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/ 
definition/artificial_intelligence [https://perma.cc/33T2-G52T] (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). 
Amazon, Inc. has propounded their own definition of AI as “the field of computer science 
dedicated to solving cognitive problems commonly associated with human intelligence, such as 
learning, problem solving, and pattern recognition.” What is Artificial Intelligence?, AMAZON 
WEB SERVICES, https://aws.amazon.com/machine-learning/what-is-ai/ [https://perma.cc/3326-
92WC] (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). According to one scholar: “AI is best understood as a set of 
techniques aimed at approximating some aspect of human or animal cognition using machines.” 
Calo, supra note 15, at 403. According to another scholar:  AI “refers to machines that are capable 
of performing tasks that, if performed by a human, would be said to require intelligence.” 
Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, 
Competencies, And Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & Tᴇᴄʜ. 353, 362 (2016). 
 17. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I have 
reached the conclusion, which I think is confirmed at least by negative implication in the Court's 
decisions since Roth and Alberts, that, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws 
in this area are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography. I shall not today attempt further 
to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and 
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion 
picture involved in this case is not that.”). 
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recognize faces18 and voices,19 speak and translate multiple languages,20 
diagnose diseases,21 invest fortunes,22 suggest to us books23 and friends,24 play 
and beat us at games,25 tell us where we are and how to get to where we should 
 
 18. Facebook has been sued for its use of facial recognition technology. Patel v. Facebook 
Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 948 (N.D. Cal. 2018). See also Karnow, supra note 3, at 146–47 (AI trained 
itself to recognize cats by examining thousands of images and finding the commonalities). There 
have however been some serious issues in facial recognition technology. For example, photos of 
African Americans have identified as photos of gorillas rather than people. Jessica Guynn, Google 
Photos Labelled Black People “Gorillas,” USA TODAY (July 1, 2015, 1:15 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/07/01/google-apologizes-after-photos-identify-
black-people-as-gorillas/29567465/ [https://perma.cc/93U7-3X85]. For a discussion of this and 
related problems, see Calo, supra note 15, at 411. 
 19. Digital assistants, such as Alexa, are helping drive voice recognition technology and 
represent possible avenues for increasing office efficiency in the future. Gordon K. Eng, The 
Potential of New Digital Assistants for Office Use, 40 L.A. LAW. 34, 34 (2017). 
 20. Google Translate uses a deep neural network to discern “patterns of patterns” to make 
probabilistic translations rather than its old method of phrase-based translation. Alexandra 
Johnson, Don’t Get Lost in Translation: How Google Translate and Other AI Tools Are 
Transforming Trademark Law, ACC DOCKET, September 2017, at 74, 76 (quoting Gideon 
Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 14, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html 
[https://perma.cc/E3SE-EFXV]). 
 21. Deep Patient uses a massive amount of data to discern patterns in order to predict when 
patients were likely to be suffer from a variety of conditions. Knight, supra note 3, at 148. 
 22. The “robo-advice” market has expanded rapidly and can lower the cost of such services 
dramatically. Megan Ji, Are Robots Good Fiduciaries? Regulating Robo-Advisors Under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1543, 1544 (2017). 
 23. Amazon has a relatively simple system that recommends books based on your past 
purchases. Daniel M. Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—Or—How I Learned To Stop Worrying 
and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 
909, 954 (2013). The same sort of inductive reasoning is used for recommending music through 
Pandora or shows/films through Netflix. Id. Meanwhile, LIBRA recommends books by content 
based on information gleaned from the web used to create a user profile. F.O. Isinkayea, Y.O. 
Folajimib, & B.A. Ojokohc, Recommendation Systems: Principles, Methods and Evaluation, 16 
EGYPTIAN INFORMATICS J. 261, 265 (2015). 
 24. Gizmodo has created a tool which elucidates the cryptic “People You May Know” 
feature of Facebook. Kashmir Hill & Surya Mattu, Keep Track of Who Facebook Thinks You 
Know with This Nifty Tool, GIZMODO (Jan. 10, 2018, 11:50 AM), https://gizmodo.com/keep-
track-of-who-facebook-thinks-you-know-with-this-ni-1819422352 [https://perma.cc/XSH3-
XMD2]. 
 25. By 1997, Deep Blue had beaten the world’s top human chess player. Peter Tillers, 
Introduction: A Personal Perspective on “Artificial Intelligence and Judicial Proof,” 22 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1365, 1368 (2001). By 2016, AI had achieved what was once thought 
impossible. AlphaGo defeated the world’s top human Go player. Karnow, supra note 3, at 137. 
Watson has wiped the floor with many a contestant on Jeopardy! even without access to the 
internet. Katz, supra note 23, at 926–27. 
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be,26 and not only answer most of our daily questions but tell us which 
question we are asking and correct our spelling when it does so.27 But this all 
strikes us now as routine and unremarkable.  
As with AI outside of professional lives, professionals become so quickly 
accustomed to relying on technological innovations, we cease noticing. 
Consider how habituated lawyers are to computer applications sorting 
through thousands of case decisions and identifying the ones most relevant. 
Imagine how impressed Justice Potter Stewart would be with today’s 
Westlaw or LexisNexis.28 Consider how law firm associates from two 
decades ago would react to the extent to which law firms today can use AI 
rather than associates to review documents.29 Lawyers today can use AI for 
 
 26. GPS technology has the power to guide us where we want to go but also creates issues 
for those who would rather remain undetected. See Tim Kolesk, At the Intersection of Fourth and 
Sixth: GPS Evidence and the Constitutional Rights of Criminal Defendants, 90 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
1299, 1324–26 (2017). 
 27. Apple’s integration of autocorrect and suggestive words into its iPhones uses trained 
pattern recognitions to correct our mistakes or save valuable moments in typing. Calo, supra note 
15, at 407. The Google search bar has mastered the art of spell check and exemplifies the benefit 
of machine intelligence: by cataloguing each instance that users search for phrases and words, the 
system can now single out and predict commonly misspelled words. Katz, supra note 23, at 923–
24. 
 28. Lexis was designed to fulfill the Ohio Bar Association’s desire to create an electronic 
database for searching through opinions. See John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great 
Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of 
Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3048 (2014). Westlaw followed soon after. Id. 
Though both of these platforms were initially hamstrung by a lack of available opinions and a 
lack of the ability to search the full text of opinions, these issues were addressed over time and 
both are now virtually indispensable to modern legal research. Id. 
 29. With the rapid expansion of electronically stored information in the 1990s, a need for 
computerized search led to early attempts at navigating the huge volume of information. Remus 
& Levy, supra note 10, at 515. Initially the keyword focused search methods were far too over or 
under inclusive to solve the issue because often content and specific meanings did not correlate 
with the search terms. Id. It was not until predictive coding methods were used that the practice 
gained widespread acceptance. Id. at 515–16. “Predictive coding” initially entailed a supervising 
lawyer reviewing a sample set of documents and then classifying them as responsive or not. Id. 
They would then have the software review the training sample in order to estimate a learning 
model. It would then apply this model to the rest of the documents for relevancy. Id. After a 
federal court approved of predictive coding as a method of dealing with discovery, the practice 
expanded and more variations came into use. Id. at 516. Currently the most effective protocol sees 
a supervising attorney starting with a keyword search to identify possibly relevant documents. Id. 
They then rank these documents in order of relevancy. Id. This subset is then used to create a 
statistical model to predict responsiveness. Id. This sophisticated method has been shown to often 
be more accurate and timely than human lawyers. Id. The end result is that the demand for human 
lawyers in document review is on the decline. Id. See also Harry Surden, Machine Learning and 
Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 88–91 (2014). 
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contract review,30 predicting what judges or opposing counsel will do,31 and 
even identifying which lateral applicants should be hired.32 A few decades 
from now, there may be few lawyers who remember what it was like to 
review contracts, ponder opposing counsel’s next move, or even review 
resumes, much like today there are few lawyers who know how to research 
the law using books. Still, no doubt, those lawyers of the future will be 
anticipating the technological innovations that will lighten their professional 
load. 
There is significant literature about AI and the law written by scholars, 
lawyers, and journalists. One strand of this literature is focused on predicting 
the impact of AI on the legal profession itself. How will it affect employment 
 
 30. “Machine learning” has been integral to the uptick in performance in AI. “Machine 
learning refers to a subfield of computer science concerned with computer programs that are able 
to learn from experience and thus improve their performance over time.” Surden, supra note 29, 
at 89. This improvement in performance and recognition may be colloquially referred to as 
“learning.” Id. at 95. Diligen uses machine learning and automated intelligence to sort and 
summarize contracts while flagging important provisions. Diligen, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 2018, at 47 
(special supplement). Apttus uses machine learning to build pattern recognition on the fly, which 
enables real-time decision-making when reviewing contracts. Apttus, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 2018, at 
35 (special supplement). The AI builds its library to provide alternative provisions that are the 
most likely to be used. Id. LawGeex provides a contract review framework where the program 
uses a “playbook” set up as a firm would give an attorney. Lawgeex, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 2018, at 53 
(special supplement). The playbook is set up so that the program knows items they always want 
to see, some they will not accept, and others which are largely irrelevant to their concerns. Id. The 
AI then uses this playbook to test contracts and if it should be approved based on the criteria they 
set forth; an email will be generated which tells them they can approve the contract. Id. 
 31. Docket Alarm “create[s] a statistical model of the ways that judges and courts decide 
cases” by discerning patterns and developing predictive analytics from millions of court and 
agency documents. Docket Alarm, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 2018, at 47 (special supplement). Gavelytics 
uses natural language and guided machine learning to evaluate state court documents and provide 
metrics about trial court judge behavior, including judicial speed, by providing a “gavel score.” 
Gavelytics, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 2018, at 49 (special supplement).  
 32. Alphaserve gives law firms a brief introductory workshop to demonstrate the potential 
of AI in a variety of in-house uses. Alphaserve, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 2018, at 36 (special supplement). 
For example, Alphaserve can provide systematic resume review to help firms decide which lateral 
associates they should hire in the place of summer and first-year associates. Id. 
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of lawyers?33 How will the practice of law change?34 Is there some category 
of lawyer tasks that can never be computerized?35 Closely related is the 
literature addressing how AI may affect the delivery of legal services and 
 
 33. Some scholars believe the logical end point is a “post-professional” society where 
lawyers are all but entirely displaced. See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE 
FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONS: HOW TECHNOLOGY WILL TRANSFORM THE WORK OF HUMAN 
EXPERTS (2015); Jennifer Miller, The Future of the Professions: How Technology Will Transform 
the Work of Human Experts by Richard Susskin and Daniel Susskin, LSE REV. OF BOOKS (2016) 
(book review), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2016/02/02/book-review-the-future-of-
the-professions-how-technology-will-transform-the-work-of-human-experts-by-richard-and-
daniel-susskind/ [https://perma.cc/74Q3-4A69]. Others have taken a more moderate and 
data-driven approach and argued that some areas of law, such as document review, will be 
seriously affected while other areas, such as legal writing, do not face such serious AI disruption 
in the near future. Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 515, 519; Tanina Rostain, Robots Versus 
Lawyers: A User-Centered Approach, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 559, 563 (2017). It seems 
inevitable that software with predictive coding technology will strongly affect the future of 
discovery practice because it consistently achieves higher rates of recall and precision in 
document review than human lawyers. Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 515–16. It is not entirely 
clear that the conventional wisdom that junior lawyers will see a larger impact than partners 
actually bears out when examining the data. Id. at 532.  
 34. There is some scholarship which suggests that the extensive use of AI in discovery will 
lead to parties focusing on developing unanticipated contingencies and using the time saved by 
using AI to devote to other activities. Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 541. For years, lawyers 
have used software programs for document storage and shared document access. Id. at 513. Now, 
software aids lawyers with templating, billing, account management, and document review. Id. 
AI has the potential for practical use in the courtroom to determine the admissibility of computer-
generated evidence. Karnow, supra note 3, at 163–65. A computer can be programmed to learn 
and assess in the same way that a judge assesses the facts, in light of variant circumstances (or 
degrees of truth), and then present a result with a level of certainty. Id. at 144–45. It has been 
predicted that in the near future nearly all first drafts of most transactional documents will be 
drafted by AI. McGinnis & Russell, supra note 28, at 3051. In the future, AI may create evidence 
which may be used in the court, for example, to identify a suspect using facial recognition 
technology in which no human could come to a definitive conclusion. Karnow, supra note 3, at 
140. 
 35. “There are certain tasks that appear to require intelligence because when humans 
perform them, they implicate higher-order cognitive skills such as reasoning, comprehension, 
meta-cognition, or contextual perception of abstract concepts.” Surden, supra note 29, at 95. 
Some such tasks are likely safe from imminent computerization. It has been suggested that tasks 
requiring unstructured communication are still a long way off from being within the realm of AI 
competence. Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 537–38. For example, reasoning, which involves 
common sense, is unavailable to AI until it has been programmed to do so because it involves 
assumptions which will not be gleaned by analyzing and comparing documents. Id. These 
assumptions need to be programmed into the AI before it would be able to understand the 
underlying assumptions. Id. Brief writing, for example, often contains this sort of unstructured 
communication. Id. Further, where there are contingencies present that are markedly different 
from the model estimated by the machine, the AI will have difficulty processing in the face of 
such difference. Id. 
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justice.36 A third type of writings addresses how substantive areas of the law, 
such as evidence, need to be adapted to accommodate the use of AI.37 A fourth 
collection of scholarship directly addresses legal ethics issues. The duty to be 
familiar with emerging technologies38 and whether the developers of such 
 
 36. AI has the potential to help clients with unmet legal needs. For example, LegalZoom, 
Rocket Lawyer, and other for-profit ventures are developing automated web-based processes in 
straightforward areas of the law to offer customized legal documents for less. Rostain, supra note 
33, at 570. Other programs offer a range of legal help including a game that helps pro se litigants 
prepare for a court appearance and apps that deliver information on legal rights in different 
contexts. Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 552 n. 206; John Biggs, HelpSelf Uses Simple AI To 
Help Those in Legal Trouble, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 12, 2018, 7:10 AM) 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/12/helpself-uses-simple-ai-to-help-those-in-legal-trouble/ 
[https://perma.cc/UPJ6-5TCM] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). 
 37. For example, AI could assign different degrees of certainty and uncertainty to various 
inputs and then churn out a result with a corresponding level of certainty. Karnow, supra note 3, 
at 163–65. This process would also produce decision trees which would show the importance of 
factors on the various decisions made. Id. Experts would then provide to the judge, to determine 
admissibility, and the jury, to determine weight, a step-by-step analysis of how the program 
works, state the assumptions and underlying scientific theories, and explain the logic used to 
arrive at the results. Id. Karnow also recognizes that there must be a different standard for the use 
of AI in generating admissible evidence than there is for AI’s use in society at large. Id. at 177. 
Karnow draws a red line in the use of unvalidated software which, while used all the time in the 
world, “has no place in court.” Id. 
 38. In 2012, the American Bar Association (ABA) modified Comment 8 to Rule 1.1 to say 
that a lawyer should stay abreast of changes in relevant technology. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012). The ABA has thus pointed out the importance of 
technology in the field. Though very vague in its direction, this was by design in order to ensure 
that the lawyer’s skill changes with each new iteration of technology. Further, it is not possible to 
know what advances will come in the future that would challenge a more specific set of duties. 
See Andrew Perlman, The Twenty-First Century Lawyer’s Evolving Ethical Duty of Competence, 
22 PROF. LAW., 24, 25 (2014). Despite the vague instructions, the majority of state bars to date 
have adopted the commentary. Robert Ambrogi, Tech Competence, LAWSITES 
https://www.lawsitesblog.com/tech-competence [https://perma.cc/6KWC-ZWKV] (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2019). Thus far, the duty has mainly been applied to storage of electronic data, social 
media, discovery, and the cloud. Jamie J. Baker, Beyond the Information Age: The Duty of 
Technology Competence in the Algorithmic Society, 69 S.C. L. REV. 557, 557–58 (2018). 
Algorithms have been noticeably absent. Id. 
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may be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL)39 are the two most 
commonly discussed issues.40 
What has yet to be addressed is the extent to which it is (or will be) 
professionally appropriate for a lawyer to rely on AI. To return to the initial 
story above, in what circumstances would it have been appropriate for the 
obstetrician to rely on the computer program when prescribing medications?41 
Though it may not occur to us at first, we might also ask, in what 
circumstances would it have been appropriate to rely on Internet searches 
rather than personal knowledge or physically published drug manuals rather 
than personal knowledge to prescribe?   
How deeply should technological innovations be scrutinized to determine 
their reliability for professional use? Lawyers have long relied on commercial 
publishers of statutes and cases with little anxiety that the texts might 
incorporate publishers’ mistakes.42 And despite the well-documented 
different search results yielded in different databases by the same research 
query, no one has alleged it is professionally inappropriate to rely on only 
 
 39. It has been suggested that the current approach to UPL rules is not very useful in policing 
this area. Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 542. For starters, judges have to make normative 
judgments about whether a given program is closer to a legal services provider or a scrivener 
because the rules are applied to people in the same way as they are programs which does not 
reflect the true state of affairs. Id. There are also tasks which AI may be better suited at in a 
particular context but which may not extend to every other context. Id. at 543. Therefore, treating 
them the same as a person may not be the most efficient approach in determining whether there 
was a UPL violation. Id. Nevertheless, regulation is necessary to avoid unintended consequences 
which would likely largely fall on the poorest users of such legal technologies. Id. at 544–45. 
 40. Of course, legal ethics scholars have considered other digital technology issues, such as 
the duty to provide cybersecurity for client information. See Eli Wald, Legal Ethics’ Next 
Frontier: Lawyers and Cybersecurity, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 501 (2016); Natasha Babazadeh, Legal 
Ethics and Cybersecurity: Managing Client Confidentiality in the Digital Age, 7 J.L. & CYBER 
WARFARE 85 (2018). The issue of being paid in cryptocurrency is also a topic increasing in 
relevancy. See Lisa Miller, Getting Paid in Bitcoin: Attorneys Accepting Cryptocurrency as 
Payment Should Be Sensitive to the Fact That the Regulatory Landscape Is Likely To Change in 
the Near Future, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2018, at 19. The lack of regulatory specificity in its application 
to algorithms has been noted as a particular blindspot. Baker, supra note 38, at 558. 
 41. Skounakis v. Sotillo, No. A-2403-15T2, 2018 WL 1370216, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Mar. 19, 2018). 
 42. Perhaps some anxiety is warranted. See, e.g., Robert Ambrogi, Thomson Reuters Says 
Glitch Left Out Text From 600 Cases Since 2014, LAWSITES (Apr. 16, 2016) 
https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2016/04/thomson-reuters-says-left-text-600-cases-since-
2014.html [https://perma.cc/3UC4-RN3T] (discussing the fact that Thompson Reuters Westlaw 
had to send out an email to its clients informing them that over 600 cases had text missing due to 
a conversion error). See generally Paul Hellyer, Evaluating Shepard’s, KeyCite, and BCite for 
Case Validation Accuracy, 110 L. LIBR. J. 449 (2018) (discussing issues with the citators used by 
Lexis, Westlaw, and Bloomberg Law in identifying when cases have received negative treatment). 
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one of those databases when researching the law.43 But these tools help the 
lawyer develop her judgment on any given issue. Advanced AI, however, has 
the potential to render judgment itself on professional issues.   
The art of good judgment is the heart of professionalism. The emerging 
risk is that a professional substitutes the judgment of AI for his or her own. 
What makes the professional responsibility questions about emerging AI 
particularly hard is that a judgment of AI may, in fact, be superior to that of 
the professional’s. The belief that it is likely to be better is what would lure a 
professional into substitution. Of course, this temptation would arise only 
when the professional believed the computer knew better than he or she did, 
but we can anticipate that those situations will be increasingly common as AI 
develops. The concern then is that a lawyer may come to rely on the 
judgments of AI in situations in which the lawyer’s own professional 
understanding is too limited to judge the quality of the AI. In the long run, 
this is a concern for the existence of the profession: if AI becomes sufficiently 
impressive, non-lawyers may adequately handle the work once reserved for 
lawyers and those who once were clients may run the AI programs 
themselves.44 More practically, and more quickly, the concern will be 
determining the line between professional reliance on AI and unprofessional 
over-reliance on AI. 
B. Tax: Money, Government, and Computer Science 
Tax law is a good case study for the professional responsibility issues 
related to AI. It is a professional area that seems quite likely to be leveraged 
by AI sooner rather than later due to its political and financial importance and 
due to its long history and current state of computerized assistance. 
All governments need revenue to function, and in this is the unique 
importance of tax law. Tax law sets forth terms on which a government has 
the right to compel contributions for its purposes, and there is a long, at times 
 
 43. In comparing six different legal databases using data from 2015, the exact same inquiry 
was used to compare each database. Susan Nevelow Mart, Results May Vary, 104 A.B.A. J. 48, 
49 (2018). Only 7% of cases appeared in all of them, and over 40% of the overall cases were 
unique to a particular database. Id. The author also found that more established databases (e.g., 
Lexis Advance and Westlaw) found more cases that were relevant and unique compared to other 
databases even when limited to reported cases in one jurisdiction. Susan Nevelow Mart, Every 
Algorithm Has a POV, 22 AALL SPECTRUM 40, 42 (2017). In looking at the relevance of the top 
five search results in each database, only Lexis (64.4%) and Westlaw (77.6%) produced over 50% 
relevant cases in the identical inquiries. Susan Nevelow Mart, The Algorithm as a Human Artifact: 
Implications for Legal [Re]Search, 109 L. LIBR. J. 387, 414 (2017). 
 44. See supra text accompanying notes 28–34. 
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bloody, history of disputes over these terms.45 The American War for 
Independence was rooted in the claim that that it was “the undoubted rights 
of Englishmen, that no taxes should be imposed on them” without their 
consent or representation.46 This type of dispute between the taxing and the 
taxed is not an Anglo-American peculiarity, of course: across time and 
around the globe, citizens have violently demanded government respect 
limits on compelling contributions.47 And in countless more commonplace 
and less dramatic incidents the would-be taxed and the taxing authorities 
conflict and resolve their conflicts on the amounts to be taken.48 In tax law, 
the political relationship between government and citizen becomes most 
practical. On the one hand, as Oliver Wendell Holmes explained it, taxpayers 
should accept that taxes “are what we pay for civilized society.”49 But, on the 
 
 45. Arthur J. Cockfield & Jonah Mayles, The Influence of Historical Tax Law Developments 
on Anglo-American Laws and Politics, 5 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 41, 57 (2013). 
 46. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 recognized the authority of Parliament (exclusive of 
the Monarch) to levy taxes. Cockfield & Mayles, supra note 45, at 57. It was their claim of the 
right to no taxation without representation that led to the First Congress of the American Colonies, 
also known as the Stamp Act Congress, to make several resolutions. Id. at 58–59. The three key 
resolutions were the third: “That it is inseparably essential to the Freedom of a People, and the 
undoubted Right of Englishmen, that no Tax be imposed upon them, but with their own Consent, 
given personally, or by their Representatives.” Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress, October 
19, 1765, reprinted in DAVID F. BURG, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 373 (2d ed. 2007). The 
fourth: “That the People of these Colonies are not, and from their local Circumstances, cannot be 
represented in the House of Commons in Great-Britain.” Id. And finally, the fifth: “That the only 
Representatives of the People of these Colonies, are the Persons chosen therein by themselves; 
and that no Taxes ever have been, or can be, constitutionally imposed on them but by their 
respective Legislatures.” Id. 
 47. Several hundred tax rebellions from ancient times to the twenty-first century and in 
places across the globe hundreds of tax protests, uprisings, rebellions, and revolutions are well 
documented. See DAVID F. BURG, A WORLD HISTORY OF TAX REBELLIONS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF TAX REBELS, REVOLTS, AND RIOTS FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT, at vi (2004). 
 48. In fiscal year 2017, IRS Chief Counsel received 70,632 cases and closed 73,632 cases, 
including some received in prior years. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2017 DATA BOOK 59 (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-tax-returns-publication-1304-
complete-report [https://perma.cc/K6KH-84CL]. There is a significant difference between what 
the IRS considers audits in its reports and what may be deemed “unreal” audits which take into 
account other forms of action that require taxpayers to give the IRS information, but which do not 
technically constitute audits under the IRS definition in 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a)(1) (West 2019). 
Compare id. at 21, with 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a)(1) (West 2019). Therefore, the National Taxpayer 
Advocate’s position is that there are 9.1 million audits when combining “real” and “unreal” audits. 
Ashlea Ebeling, IRS Official Audit Rate Down but the “Real” Audit Rate Is the Problem, FORBES 
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2018/03/29/irs-official-audit-rate-
down-but-the-real-audit-rate-is-the-problem/#7701047c1f92 [https://perma.cc/KN3C-W6J4]. 
 49. Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 
87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, O., dissenting) (rejecting the Court’s holding that a state may not impose 
a tax on contracts, or the money used to secure them, which are made and performed outside of 
the state). 
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other hand, as Learned Hand explained, the government must accept that any 
taxpayer has the right to “so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low 
as possible.”50 The professional duties of the tax professional inhere in 
articulating both the government’s right to compel contribution and the 
taxpayer’s right to contribute no more than necessary.51 
There is also good reason to anticipate that tax law will be a field in which 
substantial AI advances emerge sooner rather than later. Tax is, of course, the 
place the money is: with 3.4 trillion dollars passing from private hands to 
U.S. government coffers each year,52 both the government and taxpayers have 
not only the financial interest but the financial resources to develop AI. The 
demand for AI advances also can be measured in the number of taxpayers 
and not just their dollars: more than two hundred million individuals file 
income tax returns each year, and nearly eleven million business entities.53 
Filing and processing these returns is one of the greatest undertakings of data 
management on the planet each year. Tax compliance and administration, and 
even ex ante tax planning, are, ultimately, tasks of collecting and analyzing 
data.54 The tax field is tailored for help from AI advances, which is one reason 
to anticipate its development. 
 
 50. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630 (1916) (holding that in order to receive the 
benefit of the law, a taxpayer must still conform to the purpose of the tax law which means more 
than simply meeting statutory definitions contained within the law) (“We agree with the Board 
and the taxpayer that a transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its 
immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to evade, taxation. Any 
one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose 
that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s 
taxes.”); Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d. 809, 810 (2nd Cir. 1934) (citing U.S. v. Isham, 84 U.S. 
496, 505 (1873)). 
 51. In tax parlance, a taxpayer arranging “his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as 
possible” is known as tax avoidance and is legitimate. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX EVASION 
https://apps.irs.gov/app/understandingTaxes/whys/thm01/les03/media/ws_ans_thm01_les03.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9M6P-4EKC]. What is illegitimate is not paying the tax rightly due; this is 
known as tax evasion. Id. 
 52. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 48, at 11. 
 53. 204,405,851 for individuals (doubling the amount for married filing jointly and 
surviving spouses), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 1304 at 48 (2018); 10,939,213 
business entities in 2017, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 48, at 4. 
 54. Former IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman said that what “really matters” to the IRS is 
“the organization of data and ultimately the knowledge and intelligence we extract from the 
information.” Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., Prepared Remarks of IRS Commissioner 
Doug Shulman to the Leaders & Legends Series, Johns Hopkins Carey Business School, 
Baltimore (May 18, 2011) (https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-11-055.pdf)  
[https://perma.cc/J8D2-EZ69]. Though the use of data analytics in the tax realm has been 
primarily concerned with hindsight, there is a push to drive the applications further for predictive 
and prescriptive uses to enable organizations to have a better understanding of likely tax burdens 
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Tax professionals have long thought the field ready for computerization. 
By 1958, there were two committees of the Taxation Section of the American 
Bar Association (ABA) that were tasked with exploring the use of computers 
in the tax field.55 The tax bar was following the lead of the IRS. In 1955 the 
IRS had begun testing computers for two different purposes: one, processing 
returns, and two, analyzing data.56 As for processing returns, the IRS was 
successful in its first experiment: over one million returns were processed this 
way in 1955.57 In 1958, the IRS began installing computers in various centers 
around the country.58 By 1965, all business return processing was 
computerized, and, two years later, all returns nationwide were.59 By 1967, 
the IRS had a computerized file on every taxpayer in the nation.60  
As to analyzing statistics, the IRS early realized the value of what today is 
called “Big Data.”61 This data was used to provide timely reports on income 
and economic activity for the government.62 It also was used to determine the 
best methods of collection, the most common causes of errors, and how the 
IRS might better facilitate voluntary compliance.63 Very importantly, on the 
basis of the data, the IRS developed a mathematical technique to select 
returns for audit.64 This technique–the Discriminant Index Function (DIF)–
used algorithms developed by sampling returns to identify returns having a 
high probability of error.65 To this day, the DIF score is used to determine 
 
in normal operations and in hypothetical situations when they are weighing options as well as 
using analytics to test for the potentiality of errors within a sample group. See Tax Data Analytics: 
A New Era for Tax Planning and Compliance, DELOITTE 6 (2016), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/Tax/us-tax-data-analytics-a-
new-era-for-tax-planning-and-compliance.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7T3-37P9]. Machine learning 
can be used to build heuristics over time through inferences found in analyzing data patterning. 
Harry Surden, Machine Learning and the Law, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 87, 91 (2014). This is easily 
translated into the realm of tax law. 
 55. Report on the Special Committee on Electronic Data Retrieval, 86 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 
669, 669 (1961). 
 56. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, IRS HISTORICAL FACT BOOK: A 
CHRONOLOGY 161 (1993) [hereinafter IRS HISTORICAL FACT BOOK]. 
 57. These returns were Form 1040As filed in the Omaha Region. Id. 
 58. The IRS installed IBM 650 computers in the Northeast Service Center, the Kansas City 
Service Center, and the Ogden Service Center. Id. at 164. 
 59. Sheldon S. Cohen, Automation and Tax Administration, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 69 (1967). 
 60. Id. at 70; Mortimer M. Caplin, Commissioner Caplin Reviews His Record as IRS Chief, 
29 VA. TAX REV. 177, 178 (2009). 
 61. See Caplin, supra note 61, at 179. 
 62. Cohen, supra note 59, at 70. 
 63. Id. at 72. 
 64. Singleton B. Wolfe, The Use of Computers in Tax Administration, 17 JURIMETRICS J. 
215, 215 (1977); IRS HISTORICAL FACT BOOK, supra note 56, at 191. 
 65. Id. 
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whether the tax return should be given closer review.66 How this scoring 
works is a closely guarded secret.67   
While the IRS was focused on using algorithms for audit purposes, and 
generally improving its processing of hundreds of millions of returns each 
year, the emerging focus of tax professionals was using computers for 
business tax planning. Beginning in 1971, a recent graduate of Harvard Law 
School, L. Thorne McCarty combined his education in mathematics and 
philosophy with his legal training as a Law and Computer Fellow at Stanford 
Law School.68 With funding provided by the IBM Corporation and computers 
provided by the Stanford Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, McCarty began 
experimenting with AI’s ability to assess the tax consequences of corporate 
reorganization plans and, thereby, also to address fundamental and 
philosophical issues about the nature of law and legal reasoning.69 His 
experiment in the tax field caught the attention of others interested in 
computerized legal reasoning.70 McCarty published his programming 
techniques and his reflections on its potential and limitations in the Harvard 
Law Review in 1977, predicting that a prototype useful for corporate tax 
planning might be developed before the end of the 1980s.71  
 
 66. See infra note 107. 
 67. Michael B. Lang & Jay A. Soled, Disclosing Audit Risk to Taxpayers, 36 VA. TAX REV. 
423, 432–33 (2017); See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 
4.19.11.1.5.1(8)–(9) (Nov. 9, 2007) (explaining that “DIF mathematical formulas are confidential 
in nature and are distributed to IRS personnel only on a need-to-know basis” and that “DIF 
formulas are for official use only and will not be discussed with unauthorized personnel”). See 26 
U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2) (2019). See also Buckner v. IRS, 25 F. Supp. 2d 893, 898 (N.D. Ind. 1998) 
(DIF scores are exempt from FOIA). 
 68. L. Thorne McCarty, Reflections on Taxman: An Experiment in Artificial Intelligence 
and Legal Reasoning, 90 HARV. L. REV. 837, 837 n.* (1977). 
 69. Id. at 837 n.*, 839, 849. 
 70. See, e.g., PHILIP SLAYTON, RADICAL COMPUTER USE IN LAW 67–68 (drft. Report, June 
1974); Hélène Bauer-Bernet & Ejan Mackaay, Effect of Information Science on the Formation 
and Drafting of Law, 14 JURIMETRICS J. 235, 248 n.14 (1974); William E. Boyd, Law in 
Computers and Computers in Law: A Lawyer’s View of the State of the Art, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 267, 
286–87 n.107 (1972); Walter G. Popp & Bernhard Schlink, JUDITH, A Computer Program to 
Advise Lawyers in Reasoning a Case, 15 JURIMETRICS J. 303, 313–14 (1975); Philip Slayton, 
Electronic Legal Retrieval, 15 JURIMETRICS J. 108 (1974) (prepared for the Canadian Department 
of Communications). 
 71. McCarty, supra note 68, at 892. About the time this article was published, the use of 
computers for word processing was only emerging. See David S. Dunkle, The ERISA: The 
Attorney and the Computer, 17 LAW OFF. ECON. & MGT. 378 (1976) (touting a plan for ERISA, 
a computerized document assembly services). The attorney need take no more than one hour to 
select from the seven pages of options available, and then only another half hour reviewing the 
final document when it was delivered. Id. at 380. The service had a “[n]ormal turnaround time” 
of “ten to fifteen days,” though under special “prearranged conditions” the documents could be 
available within forty-eight hours. Id. at 379. Within that context, McCarty’s prediction was 
remarkably bold. 
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Not long after McCarty published his article, Professor Robert Hellawell 
of Columbia Law School published a similar article in the Columbia Law 
Review.72 He considered McCarty’s technical methodology to be too 
“ambitious,” and so set out to write a corporate tax planning program that 
used a different methodology.73 The following year, Hellawell published his 
efforts to computerize tax planning for U.S. taxpayers investing in foreign 
mines.74 Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the potential to computerize 
tax planning continued to lure experts into the field.75 But no prototype useful 
for tax planning emerged.76 
But while tax planning was not transformed by computerization in the 
1980s, as McCarty had hoped it might be, tax compliance was. Tax form 
preparation software began emerging in the early 1980s.77 In 1982, Jackson 
Hewitt Tax Services took a radical step in requiring its form preparers to use 
software.78 By 1987, about 13% of paid preparers used software.79 The 
forerunner of TurboTax was designed in 1983, and by 1990 earned $19 
million in annual revenue, though well into the 1990s fewer than 10% of 
 
 72. See Robert Hellawell, A Computer Program for Legal Planning and Analysis: Taxation 
of Stock Redemptions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1363 (1980). 
 73. Id. at 1365 n.5. 
 74. See Robert Hellawell, CHOOSE: A Computer Program for Legal Planning and 
Analysis, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 339 (1981) (for U.S. tax planning of foreign mining 
investments). 
 75. See, e.g., Dean A. Schlobohm & L. Thorne McCarty, EPS II: Estate Planning with 
Prototypes, PROC. OF THE 2D INT’L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND L. 1, 1–10 (1989) 
(EPS II for U.S. testamentary tax planning); Kathryn E. Sanders, Representing and Reasoning 
About Open-Textured Predicates, PROC. OF THE 3D INT’L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
AND L. 137, 137–44 (1991) (CHIRON system that structures real estate transactions to generate 
most favorable tax consequences); David B. Skalak & Edwina L. Rissland, Arguments and Cases: 
An Inevitable Intertwining, 1 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 3 (1992) (CABARET system for 
U.S. home office tax deduction). In the 1980s, interest in computerized tax planning was also 
gaining ground outside the U.S. See, e.g., J. R. Mace & P. F. Pope, Tax Planning and Computer 
Simulation, 1980 BRIT. TAX REV. 45, 45 (1980). 
 76. Sanders, supra note 75. 
 77. Rodney P. Mock & Nancy E. Shurtz, The TurboTax Defense, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 443, 
455 (2014). There were multiple news articles detailing the rise of such software. See, e.g., Don 
Nunes, Computer Programs Aid Tax Return Preparation, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 1983), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1983/02/14/computer-programs-aid-tax-
return-preparation/e2f94291-4ef8-40b5-b900-22a0dd34d7c8/?noredirect=on 
[https://perma.cc/XPF4-U2KH]; Ellen Benoit, The Tax Preparation Revolution, FORBES, Jan. 17, 
1983, at 69. See also John W. Hazard, Doing Your Taxes by Computer, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., Mar. 19, 1984, at 86; William D. Marbach, Now, the Electronic Tax Man, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 
19, 1984, at 106; David E. Sanger, Software for Doing Your Own Return, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 
1984, § 12, at 76. 
 78. Mock & Shurtz, supra note 77, at 456. 
 79. Jackson Hewitt helped pave the way for the fast growth by requiring all its preparers to 
use tax software, which helped lead to the 13% figure by 1987. Id.  
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individuals used return preparation software.80 Today, of course, virtually all 
professional preparers use return preparation software,81 as do over one-third 
of individual taxpayers.82 And the majority of the other individual taxpayers 
use preparers who, of course, use return preparation software.83 The result is 
that virtually all U.S. tax returns are prepared with computers. 
While computerized tax form preparation is remarkable, it is not as 
remarkable in terms of computerized legal reasoning as it may seem.84 As 
Northwestern Law Professor Sarah Lawsky has pointed out: these programs 
computerize tax forms—not tax law.85 As Lawsky explains it: 
Tax forms are extraordinary in that they are designed so that people 
who do not know or understand the law can still comply with the 
law. Indeed, people may have absolutely no idea why they are 
filling out certain lines, or what the legal implications of those lines 
are. And yet they do fill out the forms, and they do thus comply with 
the law.86 
While the form preparation programs make it easier for taxpayers to 
prepare their returns, the difficulties in computerizing legal reasoning are 
 
 80. Id. at 455–56. 
 81. Id. at 456. 
 82. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 48, at 5, 8, tbls.3 & 4. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Indeed, as popular as such programs are, there are shortcomings documented. See, e.g., 
Bryan Camp, Lesson for Tax Day: When Tax Prep Software Gets It Wrong, TAXPROF BLOG (Apr. 
15, 2019), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2019/04/lesson-for-tax-day-when-tax-prep-
software-gets-it-wrong.html [https://perma.cc/B2AW-2UK2] (discussing how he has had to 
correct tax preparation software while doing his taxes); Tobie Stranger, Can You Trust Online 
Do-It-Yourself Tax Prep? CR’s Evaluation Raises Questions, CONSUMER REP. (Mar. 15, 2019), 
https://www.consumerreports.org/taxes/can-you-trust-online-do-it-yourself-tax-prep-cr-
evaluation-raises-questions/ [https://perma.cc/D39K-54RN] (discussing several issues with the 
most popular programs including mistakes regarding the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, using old tax 
laws, and not discovering an input error that was intentionally made). 
 85. Professor Lawsky has worked with the MIT Lab to propose changes to the I.R.C. to help 
AI grasp with the semantic difficulties inherent in the code. Marcos Pertierra, Sarah Lawsky, Erik 
Hemberg & Una-May O’Reilly, Towards Formalizing Statute Law As Default Logic Through 
Automatic Semantic Parsing, ASAIL 2017: 2nd Workshop on Automated Semantic Analysis of 
Information in Legal Texts, 2017 (available at http://groups.csail.mit.edu/EVO-
DesignOpt/groupWebSite/uploads/Site/ASAIL_2017_Pertierra.pdf) [https://perma.cc/B95K-
Z5DT]. In her upcoming paper, she discusses the issue of software as computerizing forms rather 
than the law. See Paul Caron, Lawsky Presents ‘Form As Formalization’ Today at Wayne State, 
TAXPROF BLOG (Jan. 28, 2019), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2019/01/lawsky-
presents-form-as-formalization-today-at-wayne-state.html [https://perma.cc/C9RE-FAWX]. 
 86. Sarah B. Lawsky, Comment, Form As Formalization, J. OF L. AND POL’Y FOR THE INFO. 
SOC’Y (forthcoming 2019); see also Caron, supra note 85. 
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avoided by the form preparation program developers: the developers merely 
follow the lead of the form’s instructions.87 
There has yet to be developed a computerized application that would 
transform professional tax planning in the sense of a program that proposes 
customized tax solutions. That is, computerized applications for the ex ante, 
creative, predictive professional work focused on the unique situation and 
aspiration of a taxpayer. That is not to say that there have not been significant 
innovations. Not only has tax research benefitted from the same types of 
advances all legal research has, but one of the first legal field-specific uses of 
IBM’s AI program, Watson, was tax.88 There are also programs to guide tax 
professionals to determine the most tax advantageous choice in routine 
situations.89 While we can easily imagine programs that would do more, we 
should notice how far into the process we are by noting how bedazzled our 
twentieth-century professional ancestors would be by what is already 
commonplace in tax practice. 
Both scholars and tax professionals are at work on further advancing the 
computerization of the tax field. For example, Lawsky’s research into the 
logic of the tax code and the potential for Congressional formalization of 
statutes continues the foundational, conceptual, and philosophical work that 
first appeared in the 1970s and 1980s.90 Computer scientists continue to 
 
 87. Lawsky, supra note 86. 
 88. Blue J was founded by law faculty at the University of Toronto in 2015 after one 
member was inspired while judging an IBM Watson competition. While initially focused on tax 
law in Canada, the company has since branched out into employment law and seeks to expand 
into other areas of U.S. law. Chris Sorensen, U of T startup Blue J Legal raises US$7 million, 
plans cross-border expansion, U OF T NEWS (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.utoronto.ca/news/u-t-
startup-blue-j-legal-raises-us7-million-plans-cross-border-expansion [https://perma.cc/R6WV-
SWHU]. Blue J uses AI to predict the outcome of tax cases by essentially conducting an interview 
and comparing the facts to previous cases and outputs a legal memo. The National Law Journal 
2018 Ai Leaders, NAT’L L. J. 33, 39 (2018). 
 89. See, e.g., BLOOMBERG INCOME TAX PLANNER, https://www.bna.com/bna-income-tax-
p17179917939/ [https://perma.cc/LXK9-KYZ3]; CCH PROSYSTEM FX PLANNING, 
https://taxna.wolterskluwer.com/professional-tax-software/prosystem-fx/planning 
[https://perma.cc/7XF9-RBF5]; THOMSON REUTERS PLANNER CS, 
https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/us/en/cs-professional-suite/planner-cs [https://perma.cc/E6WZ-
QU2K]. 
 90. See generally Sarah B. Lawsky, A Logic for Statutes, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 60 (2018) 
(arguing for an alternative understanding of rule-based legal reasoning in some contexts which 
abandons formal logic following from deductive reasoning in favor of default logic using 
defeasible reasoning); Sarah B. Lawsky, Formalizing the Code, 70 TAX L. REV. 377 (2017) 
(arguing that lawmakers should more thoroughly address definitional scope in the I.R.C. by 
logically defining terms in order to alleviate problems in interpreting statutes and help lay the 
groundwork for AI to more fully develop an understanding of the Code); Pertierra, Lawsky, 
Hemberg & O’Reilly supra note 85. 
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pursue topics in AI and taxation.91 And the world’s “Big 4” accounting firms 
tout their AI and related consulting services.92 The confluence of advances in 
this research and the commercialization of expertise occurring in a well-
financed field that is already substantially penetrated by computerization 
make tax a very interesting—and perhaps uniquely interesting—AI horizon.93 
III. AI AND TAX PROFESSIONALS 
A. Planning, Compliance, Audit, and Litigation 
To view the AI horizon in tax practice, one must see what the practice of 
tax law is and who is involved. The practice of tax law involves four types of 
services, which are provided by a half dozen types of practitioners: certified 
public accountants (CPAs), lawyers, enrolled agents, enrolled actuaries, 
enrolled retirement plan agents, and tax return preparers.94 The four types of 
services are planning, compliance, audit representation, and litigation.95 
These services may be performed for all types of taxpayers and across all 
 
 91. For example, several computer scientists at the MIT Computer Science & Artificial 
Intelligence Lab are working on the STEALTH (Simulating Tax Evasion And Law Through 
Heuristics) project to apply AI to identify tax non-compliant partnership behavior. See THE 
STEALTH PROJECT, http://stealth.csail.mit.edu/index.html [https://perma.cc/KFJ8-7XG5] (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
 92. See ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI), DELOITTE, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/tags/artificial-intelligence.html 
[https://perma.cc/4USP-ZJAK] (last visited Sep. 5, 2019); ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
CONSULTING SERVICES, EY, https://www.ey.com/en_gl/advisory/artificial-intelligence-
consulting-services [https://perma.cc/G2WF-SN4M] (last visited Aug. 24, 2019); ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE, KPMG, https://advisory.kpmg.us/services/data-analytics/artificial-
intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/B4C6-3A95] (last visited Aug. 24, 2019); TAX ANALYTICS 
AND DATA VISUALIZATION COURSES: PWC, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/tax/tax-
innovation.html [https://perma.cc/5QYE-2SHF] (last visited Aug. 24, 2019). On PwC, see also 
Michael Cohn, Tax Professionals Expected To Use AI More in the Future, 
ACCOUNTINGTODAY.COM (May 1, 2017), https://www.accountingtoday.com/news/tax-
professionals-expected-to-use-ai-more-in-the-future [https://perma.cc/ZD4R-A6CU]. 
 93. See Steven K. Rainey, Brad Brown & David B. Kirk, Bots, Natural Language 
Processing, and Machine Learning, TAX EXECUTIVE (Sept. 21, 2017), 
http://taxexecutive.org/bots-natural-language-processing-and-machine-learning/ 
[https://perma.cc/8MHN-FHVJ] (discussing the impact of bots, natural language processing, and 
machine learning on tax practice and arguing that the real power of cognitive computing is its 
ability to ingest massive amounts of data). 
 94. 31 U.S.C. § 10.3(a)–(f) (2019). Even though tax return preparer registration is 
contemplated by § 10.3(f), the IRS has been denied the authority to regulate return preparers in 
these regulations. Loving v. IRS. 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that the IRS did not 
have authority to promulgate the regulations). See also infra text accompanying notes 192–94. 
 95. Id. 
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income levels: low-income individuals and multi-national corporations, 
small business and large charities, and trusts and partnerships of all sizes and 
purposes.96 
Tax planning is developing ex ante strategies to accomplish business or 
personal goals with the least tax costs.97 The tax plan is Learned Hand’s 
taxpayer arranging his affairs so that his taxes shall be as low as possible.98 
Plans may range from the straightforward and uncontroversial, such as the 
benefits of converting one type of retirement account into another,99 to 
complicated and controversial tax shelter plans, which are aimed to lower tax 
costs without regard to true economic costs or true business or personal 
goals.100 
 
 96. According to the most recent statistics available from the IRS on income tax returns, 
there were 150,690,787 individual returns, 2,050,182 C or other corporation returns, 4,842,706 S 
corporation returns, 4,046,325 partnership returns, and 2,994,547 trust and estate returns filed in 
fiscal year 2017. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 48, at 15–17, tbl.3. 
 97. Tax planning is designing transactions that “lessen tax liability and maximize after-tax 
income” when compared to alternatives. WORKSHEET: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TAX 
AVOIDANCE AND TAX EVASION, https://apps.irs.gov/app/understandingTaxes/whys/thm01/les03/ 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/UF3B-PCKZ] (last visited Sep. 5, 2019). Tax avoidance is the minimization 
of taxes; the evasion of taxes is illegal. Id. The IRS offers a publication on the differences between 
the two. Id. 
 98. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2nd Cir. 1934) (“We agree with the Board and 
the taxpayer that a transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its 
immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to evade, taxation. Any 
one [sic] may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to 
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase 
one’s taxes.”). 
 99. For example, it may be advisable to a client facing imminent death to convert an IRA to 
a Roth IRA in order to facilitate tax exempt withdrawals by heirs later while using the immediate 
tax consequences to offset income liability on the estate. John J. Scroggin, Income Tax Planning 
for Clients with Shorter Life Expectancies, 92 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 197, 204 (2014). 
 100. “Tax shelters” are usually considered abusive. However, the technical definition 
includes “any plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such . . . plan or arrangement is the 
avoidance . . . of Federal income tax.” 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (West 2019). This definition of 
“tax shelter” technically seems to include legitimate tax planning, such as determining when it is 
tax advantageous to convert an IRA into a Roth IRA. Separating an abusive “tax shelter” from a 
non-abusive tax plan is notoriously difficult. Former IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz contrasted 
abusive and non-abusive tax shelters. Michael Hatfield, Committee Opinions and Treasury 
Regulation: Tax Lawyer Ethics, 1965-1985, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 675, 700 (2014). Non-abusive tax 
shelters “admittedly reduced ‘the equity of the tax system by reducing the taxes . . . of upper 
income taxpayers,’ but for non-abusive shelters, Congress had decided this was a ‘tolerable side 
effect of a special tax provision’ to encourage particular investments.” Id. (quoting Jerome Kurtz, 
Commissioner’s Remarks on Abusive Tax Shelter Issues, 55 TAXES - THE TAX MAG. 774, 774 
(1977)). In contrast, “[a]busive tax shelters were the ones in which the loss of equity was not 
offset by intended greater benefits and that, accordingly, decreased the fairness of and respect for 
the tax system.” Id. 
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Tax planning aims to create tax-advantageous transactions, while 
compliance reports transactions after they occur.101 These reported 
transactions may be as straightforward as compensation payments from 
employers to employees,102 or cash donations by individuals to charities,103 
or may be as complicated as corporate mergers and acquisitions.104 All 
taxpayers report their tax relevant transactions to the IRS at least once a year, 
though many taxpayers report more frequently.105 
 
 Historically, there has been a struggle to develop a consensus definition of tax shelters. 
Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation: A Much Needed 
Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697, 703 (2009). However, there is broad agreement 
that they are carefully designed transactions to derive unintended benefits from the Code while 
technically following the letter of the law. Id. at 699. There have been several difficulties in trying 
to target tax shelters. Id. at 703–10. To begin with, tax laws are prospective in nature, which 
means that even when targeted behavior is later regulated, the ill-gotten gains are left untouched. 
Id. Even as Congress works to remedy the issues, new ones can arise with each fix and the more 
time that passes allows more taxpayers to take advantage of the loophole. Id. After efforts to curb 
the practice in the 70s and 80s, tax shelter structures became more and more complicated and 
varied, which makes regulation more difficult in the first place. Id. To make matters worse, more 
players entered the tax shelter game and the aggressiveness of positions increased, which further 
makes regulation harder. Id. Because courts are not limited by retroactivity in the way lawmakers 
are, they have played an important role in curbing tax shelters. Id. Courts utilize several tests to 
determine whether the transaction fails as a tax shelter. Id. However, these have also proved 
inadequate in dealing with the problem of tax shelters because there are issues of subjectivity and 
the inability to address the target directly. Id. 
 101. With respect to compliance, the professional “takes ‘the facts as he finds them’ and 
claims a position, functioning principally as an advocate.” See, e.g., Hatfield, supra note 100, at 
694 n.151 (2014) (citing Paul J. Sax, Lawyer Responsibility in Tax Shelter Opinions, 34 TAX 
LAW. 5, 37–38 (1980)). 
 102. As a sole proprietor filing for 2018, the amount paid as compensation to employees is 
reported on the 2018 Schedule C, line 26. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Schedule C (Form 1040-
2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040sc.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8ML-LPNV]. 
 103. Charitable contributions are entered on Schedule A, lines 11–14. INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., Schedule A (Form 1040-2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f1040sa--2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EGB2-B8M9]. 
 104. For example, in a C corporate stock acquisition where a consolidated return will be filed, 
the entity must attach a Form 1122 and 851 to the Form 1120 on which it must elect that it is a 
consolidated return on line A. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return 
Form 1120 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120.pdf [https://perma.cc/DP6R-LWWL]. 
In such a situation, the tax attributes of the purchased stock carryover and require the consolidated 
corporation to account for these attributes and ensure § 382 and § 383 limitations on such tax 
attributes are considered. This is just a snippet of the complications involved in a corporate 
acquisition. 
 105. 26 U.S.C. § 6012 requires annual reporting for all those required to prepare a return 
under the income tax under Schedule A. 26 U.S.C. § 6012 (2019). 26 U.S.C. § 6654 requires those 
taxpayers required to make estimated tax payments to do so multiple times a year. Id. § 6654. 
Likewise, 26 U.S.C. § 3102 requires that employers deduct payroll taxes whenever they pay 
employees. Id. § 3102. 
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Regardless of the type of taxpayer, any report to the IRS may prompt 
questions as to the accuracy or completeness of the report. These questions 
to the taxpayer may be automated inquiries prompted by mathematical errors 
on the report or inconsistences between one taxpayer’s reporting and 
another’s.106 The questions may also be prompted by suspicion of the return 
reflected in a DIF score or some other curiosity.107 Of course, tax 
professionals often represent taxpayers when the IRS questions the accuracy 
or completeness of the reporting.108 
If an audit is completed by the IRS but a dispute remains, then the taxpayer 
has recourse to the courts. This final type of tax practice is litigation against 
the government in these situations. The litigation may be in federal district 
court, the Court of Claims, or the Tax Court, and may involve not only civil 
 
 106. The National Taxpayer Advocate points out that the audit process includes both “real” 
and “unreal” audits. 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, IRS TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., 49, 50–
55 (2018), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017-
ARC/ARC17_Volume1_MSP_04_AuditRates.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QKB-E4M3]. “Real” 
audits include correspondence audits (done through the mail and typically dealing with only a 
few issues), field exams (which include face to face meetings with the taxpayer and dealing with 
more complicated issues), and office audits (which are conducted at the local office and typically 
split the difference in complexity with the other two). Id. “Unreal” audits are other investigative 
functions which are not part of a formal audit, but which nevertheless require the taxpayer to 
respond to IRS inquiries. Id. These are wide-ranging and include statutory authority to circumvent 
normal deficiency procedures in certain cases involving math/clerical errors, the Automated 
Underreporter Program which automatically matches informational returns and tax returns, a 
program which seeks out possible fraud and requires the taxpayer to verify information, and the 
Automated Substitute for Return (ASFR) process for taxpayers with significant tax liability but 
who have failed to file a return. Id. Because these “unreal” audit functions do not count as an 
“audit,” they are not constrained by some of the protections built into the formal audit process. 
For example, a person subject to ASFR would still be eligible for a formal audit later. Id. See 
CAROLINE RULE, IRS PROCEDURES: EXAMINATIONS AND APPEALS (PORTFOLIO 623), § IB (3d ed. 
2013) (describing the mostly automated review of all tax returns). For discussions on DIF scores, 
see Allen Madison, The IRS’s Tax Determination Authority, 71 TAX LAW. 143, 148 (2017); Lang 
& Soled, supra note 67, at 432–33; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., I.R.S. FACT SHEET 2 (2006), 
available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-06-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6PL-3AWG] 
(“Some returns are selected for examination on the basis of computer scoring. Computer programs 
give each return numeric ‘scores.’ The Discriminant Function System (DIF) score rates the 
potential for change, based on past IRS experience with similar returns.”); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 64–67. 
 107. Madison, supra note 106. 
 108. Note that attorneys, CPAs, and enrolled agents in good standing may “represent[] a 
client at conferences, hearing, and meetings” with IRS officers and employees. 31 C.F.R 
§§ 10.2(a)(4), 10.3(a)–(c) (2019). Enrolled actuaries, enrolled retirement plan agents, and 
registered tax return preparers may also represent clients but only in specific situations. Id. 
§ 10.3(d)–(f). 
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claims about the correct characterization of the transaction, but also criminal 
claims about the taxpayer’s knowledge, intentions, and behavior.109 
The tax field is shared not only by multiple professionals but also by non-
professionals.110 Any individual may prepare another’s tax return. While the 
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.), located at Title 26 of the United States Code 
(26 U.S.C.), prescribes penalties for improper reporting by a return 
preparer,111 there are no education or qualification requirements or other 
types of regulation for tax return preparers.112 While lawyers and CPAs who 
 
 109. ROBERT E. MCKENZIE, 1 REP. AUDITED TAXPAYER § 10:1 (2019). See generally, 
ROBERT E. MCKENZIE, 1 REP. AUDITED TAXPAYER (2019). If the taxpayer cannot pay the tax up 
front, the only available forum is the Tax Court (or bankruptcy court for certain issues). Id. at 
§ 10:3. Certain I.R.C. sections impose criminal liability. For example, in a case where there is 
intent to evade alleged rather than mere mistake, 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2019) imposes criminal 
penalties. 
 110. Attorneys, CPAs, enrolled agents, enrolled actuaries, and enrolled retirement plan 
agents may all represent clients in some capacity in front of the IRS. 31 C.F.R §§ 10.2–10.3 
(2019). 
 111. 26 U.S.C. § 6694 (prescribing penalties for preparers who take an unreasonable position 
which leads to understatement or who act recklessly/willfully which results in an understatement); 
26 C.F.R. § 1.6694-1 (2019) (clarifying requirements in § 6694, including who counts as a return 
preparer); Id. § 1.6694-2 (providing special rules and clarifications for the penalty for 
understatements due to unreasonable positions). 
 112. For well over a decade, the National Taxpayer Advocate has called for regulating these 
unregulated tax preparers. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2019 PURPLE BOOK, 10–12 (2018) (ebook). 
Citing to numerous studies, the National Taxpayer Advocate states that these preparers produce 
inaccurate returns and damage both taxpayers and the public. Id. The recommendation is for 
Congress to amend 31 U.S.C. § 330 in order to allow the IRS to resume regulating them. Id. The 
issues stemming from this lack of regulation are broad and well documented. It has been 
suggested that such lack of regulation has led to an explosion in unqualified tax preparers that are 
able to gain income from low-income taxpayers otherwise unable to pay through the EITC, which 
was designed to help these same taxpayers who must use a portion of the credit to pay the preparer. 
Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Regulating Tax Return Preparation, 58 B.C. L. REV. 
151, 154 (2017). Though there are minor requirements that software companies update tax rates 
and ensure accuracy of computations, there is virtually no testing to determine whether the 
substantive advice provided by these companies is accurate. Id. at 164. While some returns are 
undoubtedly simple, even the most complicated of returns can be completed by untrained and 
unregulated tax preparers, whether they are done accurately or not. Id. at 171. There is evidence 
to show that such unregulated return preparers are more likely to over-claim on EITC returns than 
individuals preparing the return themselves. Id. If discovered, the potential harm that could befall 
the taxpayer in these situations is considerable, including the loss of the ability to claim the EITC 
for as long as 10 years in cases of fraud. Id. at 172. If the harm to the tax system isn’t enough, 
many of these preparers charge customers hidden, and sometimes exorbitant, fees and issue high-
interest loans. Id. at 173. Some authors contend that although there are serious issues with such 
unregulated tax preparers, the same issues are also found in preparers that are already regulated. 
Steve R. Johnson, Loving and Legitimacy: IRS Regulation of Tax Return Preparation, 59 VILL. 
L. REV. 515, 521–23 (2014). The largest effort to date of the IRS attempting to regulate this sector 
of tax preparers was shot down in Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that 
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prepare returns are subject to regulation by their professional bodies, the vast 
majority of tax return preparers are not subjected to similar oversight.113 The 
problems of unregulated tax preparers are predictable, well-documented, and 
often discussed.114 
The other tax services—planning and representation in audit and 
litigation—are restricted to certain professionals. As discussed more fully 
below, all written advice for avoiding taxes is considered to be “practice 
before the IRS” and is limited to CPAs, lawyers, enrolled agents, and, in 
limited ways, to enrolled actuaries and enrolled retirement plan agents.115 No 
doubt tax planning advice is given by many others, including tax return 
preparers, bookkeepers, business and financial advisors, friends, and family 
members. But there are no practical means for the IRS to prevent such, and 
with respect to many transactions, such as contributions to education, health, 
and retirement savings accounts, the planning advice may be 
unproblematic.116 In contrast, the IRS does have the practical means to limit 
who represents a taxpayer in an audit, and that representation is limited by 
the rules of the IRS.117 If the representation before the IRS becomes 
 
the IRS did not have authority to promulgate the regs). However, some states do in fact regulate 
such tax preparers. California requires paid preparers to post a bond, take a qualifying educational 
course, and obtain a Preparer Tax Identification Number (PTIN) from the IRS. Registered Tax 
Preparers, CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, ftb.ca.gov/tax-pros/california-tax-education-
council.html [https://perma.cc/2XFF-U4AN] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019). Likewise, Oregon also 
requires completion of educational courses, obtaining a PTIN, and passing an exam. OR. REV. 
STAT. § 673.625 (2019). 
 113. Lawyers are regulated by their respective jurisdictions, and CPAs are regulated by their 
state accountancy boards. AICPA members are regulated by it, though ABA members are not 
regulated by the ABA. GALLER & LANG, supra note 4, at 7–8. 
 114. See supra note 112. 
 115. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.2(a)(4), 10.3. Unlike enrolled actuaries and enrolled retirement plan 
agents, attorneys, CPAs, and enrolled agents have general authorization to engage in tax practice. 
 116. The bases for such advice are frequently found in popular media. Jamie Hopkins, 
Understanding Tax Benefits Of 529 Plans, FORBES (Sept. 15, 2016, 9:09 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamiehopkins/2016/09/15/understanding-the-tax-benefits-of-529-
plans/#4cc084b319aa [https://perma.cc/3L8J-YLC2] (discussing the tax benefits of qualified 
tuition plans authorized under 26 U.S.C. § 529); Sarah Max, Millions of Americans Ignore This 
Ultra-Valuable Tax Break. Here’s How to Get It., MONEY (Apr. 13, 2018), 
http://money.com/money/5238579/millions-of-americans-ignore-this-ultra-valuable-tax-break-
heres-how-to-get-it/ [https://perma.cc/6D59-JH2H] (discussing the tax benefits of contributing 
money to a Health Savings Account); Teresa Mears, 7 Retirement Accounts You Should Consider, 
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP. (Jan. 23, 2019, 10:40 AM), 
https://money.usnews.com/money/retirement/articles/retirement-accounts-you-should-consider 
[https://perma.cc/C54M-QK4F] (discussing and explaining various retirement savings options 
and attendant tax benefits). 
 117. The Annual Filing Season Program (AFSP) replaced the mandatory structure rendered 
void in Loving with a voluntary system aimed at the same group of generally unregulated return 
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representation before a court, then it is the rules of the courts, rather than the 
rules of the IRS, that apply. In Tax Court, non-attorneys who pass an 
examination may represent clients,118 though, in the other courts, only 
attorneys may represent clients.119 
Of the four tax services that CPAs and lawyers provide, 120 the greatest AI 
potential is with respect to planning. Compliance and dispute resolution 
programs are already progressing steadily. As mentioned above, tax 
compliance work has been computerized for decades now, and indeed 
 
preparers. Kelly Phillips Erb, Congress Again Considers Licensing Tax Preparers, FORBES (Aug. 
2, 2018, 11:12 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2018/08/02/congress-again-
considers-licensing-tax-preparers/#131d0f392731 [https://perma.cc/B8D2-AZYT]. The IRS has 
a tool which allows users to look for a return preparer based on multiple credentials including 
participation in the AFSP. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL TAX RETURN 
PREPARERS WITH CREDENTIALS AND SELECT QUALIFICATIONS, https://irs.treasury.gov/rpo/rpo.jsf 
[https://perma.cc/5BQT-U3R7] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
 118. 20 T.C.R. § 200(a)(3) (2012). 
 119. R.C.F.C. Rule 83.1 governs admission to the Court of Federal Claims and requires the 
applicant to be a member of the bar of the highest court in their territory or state. Admission to 
practice before district courts are governed by local rules, all of which require the applicant to be 
a practicing attorney. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. CIV. L. R. § 11-1. 
120. Of the various professionals and non-professionals who work in the tax field, the 
remainder of this article will be devoted to considering CPAs and lawyers. As the two dominant 
tax professions, CPAs and lawyers and have long competed for tax work. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
concerns over how the tax field ought to be divided between lawyers and accountants became 
substantial. Whether or not accountants who engaged in tax-related work were engaging in the 
practice of law was a common question. See, e.g., Agran v. Shapiro, 273 P.2d 619 (Cal. App. 
Dep’t Super. Ct. 1954). In 1961, the ABA prohibited lawyers who were accountants from 
practicing in both professions, and the following year the ABA prohibited lawyers who were 
accountants from holding themselves out as accountants. Michael S. Ariens, American Legal 
Ethics in an Age of Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 343, 436 (2008). Maintaining the division 
between lawyers and accountants was a high priority for many lawyers. Id. Harvard Law Dean 
Erwin Griswold said of this time that “the two great professions of law and accountancy were 
squared away for a battle royal.” Erwin N. Griswold, Comment, Role of Lawyer in Tax Practice, 
10 U.S.C. SCH. L., MAJOR TAX PLANNING 1, 1 (1958) (commenting on the consequence of the 
Agran case creating strife between lawyers and accountants); see also Erwin N. Griswold, 
Lawyers, Accountants and Taxes, 10 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 52 (1955), reprinted in 18 TEX. B. 
J. 109 (1955); Erwin N. Griswold, The Tax Practice Problem I: A Further Look at Lawyers and 
Accountants, J. ACCT. 29 (1955). The National Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public 
Accountants has recognized both professions as qualified but have articulated principles that 
roughly divide the work. The Conference recognizes that both lawyers and CPAs are qualified to 
determine the probable tax effects of a transaction, but CPAs are encouraged to consult lawyers 
as to the interpretation or application of laws, and lawyers are encouraged to consults with CPAs 
as to describing the transaction in money terms or interpreting financial results. Preparing legal 
documents is the special expertise of lawyers while preparing financial statements and similar 
reports is the special expertise of CPAs. While both lawyers and CPAs are entitled to represent 
clients in Tax Court, the Conference advises CPAs to consult with lawyers when doing so. Nat’l 
Conference of Lawyers and Certified Pub. Accountants, A Study of Interprofessional 
Relationships, 56 A.B.A. J. 776, 778–80 (1970). 
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virtually no compliance remains uncomputerized.121 Advances in 
computerizing this aspect of tax practice seem likely to be persistent and 
incremental. What seems most likely are advances in data gathering and 
reporting that may make real-time reporting of transactions commonplace.122 
Professional services in audit representation and litigation will benefit as 
computer applications for resolving disputes of all types are improved. 
Whether the controversy is still within the audit stages or in the later litigation 
stages, the professional tasks are largely the same: devising and assessing 
legal arguments that fit the facts as they are. For these purposes, the 
computerization advances that benefit all litigators benefit the CPA and the 
tax lawyer. As AI advances improve the results of database search results, 
speed document review,123 and reliably predict what judges or opposing 
counsel will do,124 litigators in all fields will benefit. 
B. AI in Tax Planning 
The greatest twenty-first-century potential for AI for tax professionals 
remains as predicted in the 1970s: computerized tax planning for businesses. 
The earliest attempts to computerize business tax planning were to minimize 
taxes in corporate reorganizations, stock redemptions, and specific foreign 
investments.125 Today’s cutting-edge work in AI and taxation has attempted 
to apply the technological advances since the 1970s to achieve a considerably 
more technically complex goal: creating previously undetected tax 
 
121. See supra text accompanying notes 68–92. 
 122. Peter Horadan, The Future of Tax Compliance: Real-Time and Extensive DataSsharing, 
ACCT. TODAY (Nov. 7, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.accountingtoday.com/opinion/the-future-
of-tax-compliance-real-time-and-extensive-data-sharing [https://perma.cc/Q492-QCCU]. For an 
example of a system that has been operating and improving for almost two decades, see the 
Streamlined Sales Tax Project. What is the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP)?, SALES TAX 
INST., https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/sales_tax_faqs/streamlined_sales_tax_project_sstp 
[https://perma.cc/3HV9-GPKC] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
123. See Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 515–16 (explaining the development of 
computerized research from keyword searches to statistically-based predictions of results). 
124. See, e.g., Docket Alarm, supra note 31, at 47 (“creat[ing] a statistical model of the ways 
that judges and courts decide cases” by discerning patterns and developing predictive analytics 
from millions of court and agency documents); Gavelytics, supra note 31, at 49 (using natural 
language and guided machine learning to evaluate court documents and provide metrics about 
trial court judge behavior, including judicial speed, by providing a “gavel score”). 
125. See Hellawell, supra note 72, at 1363 (a computer program for efficient stock 
redemption tax planning); Hellawell, supra note 74, at 339 (for U.S. tax planning of foreign 
mining investments); and Thorne McCarty, supra note 68, at 837 (a program for corporate 
reorganization tax planning). 
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shelters.126 For almost fifty years there has been interest in applying cutting-
edge computer programming to the business tax planning that is the bailiwick 
of CPAs and lawyers. With the exponential growth in processor speeds, the 
continuing reductions in data storage costs, and the ongoing advances in AI 
techniques, these aspirations presumably will be met.127 
The allure of using AI in ex ante business tax planning is two-fold. First 
is obvious: the money. The total receipts of U.S. businesses each year exceeds 
$37 trillion,128 and U.S. businesses are subject to federal income tax rates up 
to 37%.129 
Second is the complexity of the taxation of that money. Those businesses 
are organized as sole proprietorships, partnerships, S corporations, and C 
corporations.130 While all businesses are subject to overlapping sections of 
the I.R.C., each of the entities has its own specific subchapter of the I.R.C. 
with the result that the taxation of any given business is determined with 
potential reference to hundreds of separate sections. There are about 25 
million (non-farm) sole proprietorships, 3.5 million partnerships, 4.3 million 
S corporations, and 1.6 million C corporations.131 The income of the first 
three is passed through to their owners’ returns, and the owners are liable for 
the taxes, while the income of a C corporation is reported on its own return, 
and it is liable for the taxes.132 
Adding to that complexity are the various non-tax aspects of businesses. 
First, the federal tax characterization and the state law characterization of an 
organization may not align. For example, a state law limited liability 
company may be characterized as a sole proprietorship, a partnership, an S 
 
126. See THE STEALTH PROJECT, supra note 91 (computer scientists at the MIT Computer 
Science & Artificial Intelligence Lab are working to generate new Subchapter K tax shelters so 
that the IRS can detect the shelters). 
127. See Katz, supra note 23, at 922 (on the non-linear development of AI). 
128. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 1980–2013 SOI TAX STATS – INTEGRATED BUSINESS DATA, 
https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-integrated-business-data [https://perma.cc/YH9W-
MWHZ] (look to “Table 1: Selected financial data on businesses” and then follow the “1980–
2013” hyperlink). 
129. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (West 2019) (the highest marginal rate for any taxpayer is that of 
individuals: currently, 37%.); see, e.g., Scott Greenberg, Pass-Through Businesses: Data and 
Policy, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 17, 2017) https://taxfoundation.org/pass-through-businesses-data-and-
policy/ [https://perma.cc/3JGM-8TPY] (an overview of the taxation of pass-through businesses). 
Since the income of pass-through businesses is taxed to its owners, the income is taxed at the 
owners’ rates. 
130. See Greenberg, supra note 129. 
131. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 128. 
132. See Greenberg, supra note 129. 
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corporation, or a C corporation for federal tax purposes.133 A second 
complication is the non-tax relationship between the business owners and the 
organization: many businesses are closely-held with a close overlap between 
management and ownership, while many other (and usually larger) 
businesses have little to no overlap between management and ownership.134 
A related complication is the relationship between the business and 
employees: in many closely held businesses the owner-managers are also 
employees, but in more widely held businesses there are few employees who 
are significant owners or managers.135 And the most obvious non-tax 
complication for planning is the indescribable variation in business models, 
locations, and histories. For some estimation of the varieties of businesses, 
consider that the list of North American Industry Classification System code 
numbers the IRS requires taxpayers to use in categorizing their businesses 
runs over 900 pages.136 
In order to speculate on the future of AI in ex ante business tax planning, 
it is useful to have a rough grasp of how tax planning occurs. Though in 
practical reality the steps are not cleanly distinct and sequential, there are five 
logical parts to a tax plan. First, the tax professional notices a potentially 
relevant tax issue either in a business goal presented by the client or in the 
professional’s review of the client’s operations. The issue is relevant to the 
extent it may impact the client’s tax liability. Second, the tax professional 
researches the facts and the law, identifying uncertainties in either. This 
research is similar to a litigator’s research: reviewing documents; talking to 
witnesses; and reading statutes, regulations, and case law. Third, in a step not 
available to those forced to try the case on the facts before them, the ex ante 
planner determines what the future facts should be and determines how best 
to create them; that is, the professional determines what actions the client 
should take and, perhaps, what actions the client should attempt to cause 
others to take. The plan is refined by further interactions with the client and 
others. Fourth, either formally or informally, the planner advises the client on 
 
133. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 8832: ENTITY CLASSIFICATION ELECTION AND 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS (2013), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8832.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
97D4-WW88]. 
134. DAVID L. GIBBERMAN & GERALYN A. JOVER-LEDESMA, 2019 PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS 
TAXATION ¶ 601.02 (Jennifer Schencker et.al. eds., 2018). 
135. Id. 
136. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, N. AM. INDUS. 
CLASSIFICATION SYS. MANUAL (2017), 
https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/2017NAICS/2017_NAICS_Manual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8CBT-9QZZ]; My NAICS Code, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last visited Aug. 24, 
2019), https://www.census.gov/smallbusiness/html/naics.html [https://perma.cc/JR26-MVPS] 
(explaining the North American Industry Classification System). 
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the appropriate characterization of the plan on the client’s future return, 
which may or may not be prepared by the planner. Finally, the plan is 
implemented through the series of actions, transactions, and documents 
advised by the planner. 
How might AI applications change this process? The greatest 
transformation of tax planning by AI would be eliminating the need of the 
tax professional to identify the potentially relevant tax issues. Instead, the 
process would begin with as much information about the client’s situation as 
is available being delivered into the AI system. An impressive feat of AI is 
its ability to detect patterns and identify relevance by searching for 
connections in the data provided to it by the human users—patterns and 
connections not previously identified by, or perhaps even noticed by, the 
human users.137 Within this information the AI system would detect patterns 
and connections, and from those identify relevant law and planning 
opportunities. The information to be delivered would include a full 
description of the client’s taxpaying and state law status and relationship with 
other businesses (e.g., a state law limited liability company taxed as a S 
corporation with overlapping ownership with another S corporation); past, 
present, and projected financial information; personal information on 
shareholders and employees (e.g., overlap between the two, relationships, 
ages, financial information); and the short-, mid-, and long-term goals of the 
client.138 The AI could be expected to generate better results with access to a 
greater quantity and quality of information. The AI system would assess the 
information, adjusting for uncertainties and missing information and making 
estimates and predictions when useful.139 
With the relevant legal issues identified and the facts duly assessed, AI 
could then generate a customized tax plan, drawing not only on the I.R.C., 
Treasury Regulations, case law, and IRS announcements, rulings, and 
publications but also on the vast number of secondary sources on tax and 
business planning, as well as from the AI system’s own prior suggestions.140 
 
137. See, e.g., Karnow, supra note 3, at 147 (describing programs that take a large amount of 
data and then makes conclusions concerning common features without either labelling the data or 
human correction); Rostain, supra note 33, at 562–63 (in contrast to expert systems that embed 
rules to sort data, data-driven systems infer relations in unstructured data). 
 138. To begin understanding the vast range of factors that should be considered in business 
planning, see, for example, Dwight Drake, BUSINESS PLANNING: CLOSELY HELD ENTERPRISES 23–
47 (Jesse H. Chopper et al. eds., 4th ed. 2013). 
 139. See, e.g., Karnow, supra note 3, at 142 (AI fuzzy logic). 
140. AI has not yet proven itself able to “suggest new and promising combinations of existing 
arguments tailored to a client’s factual circumstances,” even though it has proven itself in 
predicting how issues will be resolved in the courts. See Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 549. 
Much contemporary AI is designed to learn from its own operations. See Calo, supra note 15, at 
405; Karnow, supra note 3, at 174; Rostain, supra note 33, at 562–63. 
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As to the legal uncertainties, AI could research and resolve those 
uncertainties to an acceptable degree of confidence. As even the first 
available tax-specific legal research AI provided the user with the probability 
of a particular tax characterization being successful, it is easy to expect future 
AI to generate not only a plan but an assurance of the degree of confidence 
as to its appropriate characterization on the client’s future return.141 As 
described below, technically specified degrees of confidence are necessary to 
protect the taxpayer from penalty if the characterization is determined 
incorrect.142 Those degrees of confidence include the position having a 
reasonable basis, substantial authority, or it being reasonable to believe the 
position was more likely than not to sustain scrutiny.143 Often not only the 
last level of confidence but also the first ones are expressed, at least 
informally, as probabilities of success on the merits if the position is 
ultimately tested in court.144 
One of the most useful functions of tax planning AI might be its ability to 
answer factual, not just legal, questions. Getting the facts in place is essential 
for the success of any tax plan. For example, whether or not a particular 
employee’s compensation is reasonable is a fact issue shared by many tax 
plans and an issue often audited by the IRS.145 On the most fundamental level, 
compensation is not deductible by an employer if it exceeds a reasonable 
amount.146 But the issue also comes up in planning with both closely held C 
corporations and S corporations.147 For C corporation clients with 
shareholders that are also employees, a common tax plan is to minimize the 
 
141. See supra text accompanying note 88. 
142. See infra text accompanying notes 181–93. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. For a discussion of the importance of determining reasonableness of compensation and 
methods for determining and defending such levels, see Robert J. Grossman, The Reasonable 
Compensation Job Aid, 98 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 308 (2017); Edward R. Rataj & Priya J. 
Kapila, Reasonable Compensation Series: Part One, 97 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 209 (2016); 
Edward R. Rataj & Priya J. Kapila, Reasonable Compensation Series Part Two: Elements of 
Compensation, 97 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 269 (2016); Edward R. Rataj & Priya J. Kapila, 
Reasonable Compensation Series Part Three: Market Analysis Considerations, 98 PRAC. TAX 
STRATEGIES 330 (2017); Edward R. Rataj & Priya J. Kapila, Reasonable Compensation Series 
Part Four: Market Competitive Compensation Data, 98 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 27 (2017); 
Edward R. Rataj & Priya J. Kapila, Reasonable Compensation Series Part Five: Fundamental 
Compensation-Related Statistics, 98 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 91 (2017); Edward R. Rataj & Priya 
J. Kapila, Reasonable Compensation Series Part Six: Standard Methodology, 98 PRAC. TAX 
STRATEGIES 154 (2017). 
146. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2018) (permits only reasonable compensation to be deducted from the 
gross income of a business). See also GIBBERMAN & JOVER-LEDESMA, supra note 134, at ¶ 601.02; 
Grossman, supra note 145, at 308. 
147. See GIBBERMAN & JOVER-LEDESMA, supra note 134, at ¶ 601.02. 
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distributions to the shareholder-employees that can be characterized as 
dividends and to maximize the distributions that can be characterized as 
compensation.148 But for S corporations with shareholder-employees, the 
plan is to minimize the compensation characterizations and maximize the 
dividend characterizations.149 In both cases, the tax minimization success 
depends upon the dollar amounts characterized as compensation being 
reasonable, in fact.150 AI could generate not only the appropriate plan for the 
S corporation shareholder-employee, for example, but it could also determine 
the best dollar amount to be characterized as compensation and the best dollar 
amount as dividends by drawing on information about the employee’s 
qualifications, experience, duties, compensation history, and information on 
compensation in relevant industries.151 Similar issues, which today are 
handled by human experts, could be handled by AI as an integral part of its 
advice-generation. A tax planning AI that could address similar factual 
issues, such as the valuation of assets, for example, of equity capital interests 
in business enterprises, including corporations, partnerships, and limited 
liability companies, and whether or not a transaction has non-tax economic 
substance, which is essential to avoiding the penalties for transactions that 
lack such substance, would be extraordinarily valuable.152 
The value of AI would be amplified by its speed and ease. In the most 
obvious way, speed and ease benefit the client. The transformative potential 
is at the extremes of speed and ease where tax planning ceases to be an 
occasional process, a process prompted by a business life cycle event, 
transaction, or other extraordinary occasion. Instead, tax planning could 
become a continuous process: the continuous, even real-time delivery of 
information to AI with continuous, even real-time tax minimization planning 
being delivered by AI.153 
The great appeal of tax planning AI would be its ability to quickly and 
perhaps continuously resolve legal and factual issues in generating a tax plan 
 
148. A dividend paid by a C corporation is not deductible by the corporation, but reasonable 
compensation is deductible. Thus, for shareholder-employees it is more advantageous to the 
corporation’s ultimate tax liability to pay compensation than it is to pay dividends. Both are 
taxable the shareholder-employee’s income. Id. 
149. A dividend paid by an S corporation is not taxable to a shareholder’s income though 
compensation paid to a shareholder-employee is. Thus, unlike the situation with the C corporation 
shareholder-employees, those in an S corporation benefit from having payments characterized as 
dividends rather than compensation. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. On the importance of the valuation of equity capital interests in business enterprises, 
including corporations, partnerships and limited liability companies, see, for example, Robert J. 
Grossman, Enterprise Valuation After the TCJA, 101 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 19 (2018). 
153. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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and assessing the probability of its enduring audit and litigation. AI could be 
used to address the tax planning opportunities in the initial organization, 
subsequent reorganizations, and final liquidation of a business, and the 
comings and goings of its owners and employees, its payment of expenses, 
receipt of income, distributions of profits, its borrowing and lending, its 
expanding and contracting, and all transactions both within and beyond its 
ordinary course of business. Some of the opportunities spotted by AI, and 
some of the plans generated, would be well known to experienced business 
tax professionals. But, the great potential of tax planning appeal is that, at 
least sometimes, AI might be better at spotting opportunities and generating 
plans than those same experienced professionals. Along with speeding and 
easing the tax planning, it is this potential for AI to deliver a better plan that 
would lure professionals into AI. 
IV. PROFESSIONALISM, AI, AND TAX PLANNING 
A. Professional Responsibility Concerns 
What are the professional responsibility concerns of tax professionals 
working with AI as imagined above? The potential as imagined is for AI to 
function itself as a tax planner. Identifying relevant facts and laws, making 
appropriate assumptions and estimations, applying the law to the facts, and 
then inferring opportunities and assessing the legal risks of pursuing those 
opportunities is, in short, what CPAs and tax lawyers do. What needs to be 
considered is the professional responsibility of tax professionals working 
with what is, in some sense, their technological substitute and that, in some 
cases, performs not only as well as but better than the professionals. 
Setting aside concerns that direct taxpayer use of tax planning AI could 
displace tax planning professionals in many situations, the concern at hand is 
articulating the right use of tax planning AI by professionals. Tax 
professionals are often said to have two duties: one to the system and one to 
the client.154 This duty to the system has been described variously as the duty 
 
 154. See, e.g., GALLER & LANG, supra note 4; Schenk, supra note 4, at 2005 (claims the self-
reporting nature of the tax system means that the tax system cannot permit the “absolute 
adversarial” relationship that lawyers might have in other situations). The idea that the 
professional responsibility of tax professionals must be framed within the self-reporting nature of 
our tax system, seems the most common argument for tax lawyers’ duty to the system. Id.; see 
also WOLFMAN, HOLDEN, & HARRIS, supra note 4, at § 101.2; Infanti, supra note 4. However, 
some have criticized this conception of the tax lawyer. See, e.g., David J. Moraine, Loyalty 
Divided: Duties to Clients and Duties to Others—the Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys Made 
Possible by the Acceptance of a Duty to the System, 63 TAX LAW. 169, 190–91 (2009). 
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to the government, the Treasury, the public interest, and the duty to our 
self-assessing tax system.155 This duty has been premised on the alignment 
of patriotism, professionalism, respect for democratic government funded by 
taxes, and the need of each citizen to pay his or her share.156 It is the 
recognition that the government needs revenue to fund the public good, and 
that the professional must not lose sight of her and her client’s benefit from 
government services when advising the client on tax minimization. It is, at 
the least, the recognition that professionally responsible advising protects the 
interest of the public and not just those of the client and the professional. It 
means, in the most practical terms, that the advice not be too aggressive or 
ever premised on its likelihood of escaping detection and question.157 It is 
within this context of the tax professional as gatekeeper that the professional 
pursues her duty to minimize her client’s tax liabilities without exposing the 
client to undue risk of controversy, litigation, and penalties. The bottom line 
for tax professionals is found in balancing cleverness with caution, accepting 
that what is at stake is both the public’s good and the client’s good. 
This balancing requires the CPA or tax lawyer to understand the facts and 
law well enough to be able to adequately advise the client. If the tax 
professional does not understand, then she cannot balance the risks and 
rewards with good judgment. If she does not understand, then she cannot 
explain the risks and rewards to the client in a way that allows the client to 
understand and weigh and choose the way forward.158 The client’s relative 
lack of understanding is an important part of the relationship with a 
professional. A patient’s inability to understand what stage three non-
Hodgkins lymphoma is relative to the oncologist’s understanding is part of 
what makes the oncologist the professional. A professional relationship is 
 
155. E.g., Edmond Cahn et al., Ethical Problems of Tax Practitioners: Transcript of Tax Law 
Review’s 1952 Banquet, 8 TAX L. REV. 1, 10 (1952) (“treasury” was used in the statements by 
Thomas N. Tarleau); Norris Darrell, Conscience and Propriety in Tax Practice, 17 N.Y.U. ANN. 
INST. ON FED. TAX’N 1, 2 (1959) (using the term “self-assessing income tax system”); Mark H. 
Johnson, Does the Tax Practitioner Owe a Dual Responsibility to his Client and to the 
Government?—the Theory, 15 U.S.C. L. SCH. INST. ON MAJOR TAX PLAN. 15 (1963) (using the 
term “government”); John M. Maguire, Conscience and Propriety in Lawyer’s Tax Practice, 13 
TAX L. REV. 27, 44 (1957) (using the term “public interest”); Milton Young, Does the Tax 
Practitioner Owe a Dual Responsibility to His Client and to the Government?—the Practice, 15 
U.S.C. L. SCH. INST. ON MAJOR TAX PLAN. 39 (1963) (using the term “government”). 
156. See Merle H. Miller, Morality in Tax Planning, 10 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 
1067, 1083 (1952). 
157. The taxpayer and return preparer penalty regimes described below are aimed to 
constrain aggressive advice. The requirement that the advice is not premised on escaping audit is 
described by various authorities. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662–4(d)(2) (2019); 26 C.F.R. 
§ 1.6694–2(b)(1) (2019); 31 C.F.R. § 10.37(a)(vi) (2014). 
158. The unstructured communication involved in client counseling is likely to long remain 
beyond the functionality of AI. See Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 538. 
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always an unequal one. It requires trust and deference by the patient/client, 
and it requires an expert understanding of the situation by the professional—
an understanding that, by definition, surpasses that of the patient/client. A 
professional with an irresponsibly low understanding might encourage a 
patient/client to assume greater risks or forego greater rewards than the 
patient/client would choose if she had an expert’s understanding of the risks 
and rewards. A tax professional with an irresponsibly inadequate 
understanding either might induce the client to claim overly aggressive tax 
benefits with unacceptably high risks of legal defeat and financial penalties 
or, equally irresponsibly, might preclude the client from claiming tax benefits 
to which she is certainly entitled. 
A professionally adequate understanding of the facts and laws benefits not 
only the client by enabling her to minimize her taxes without undue risks but 
also the public good. When public resources are spent enforcing laws that 
adequate professional advice would have kept the taxpayer from violating, 
the efficiency of the taxing system is diminished by the increased 
administrative costs. And when the taxpayer with an illegally low tax liability 
escapes detection or enforcement, then the total revenue that should have 
been collected for the public good is diminished.159 Either through the 
increased costs or decreased revenue, the public good is harmed. Thus, the 
duty of the tax professional to understand well enough to advise and explain 
reflects the professional duty to both the system and the client. 
With the potential for the tax planning AI used by the professional to 
become a technological substitute for the professional’s understanding, the 
temptation will be for the professional to defer to the AI analysis in every 
instance. This temptation will be as strong as the AI seems good. But by 
deferring, the professional would make the AI into a substitute for the 
professional. The heart of professionalism lies in asserting judgement, not in 
 
159. Periodically, the IRS estimates the level of compliance with federal revenue laws by 
estimating the tax gap. From its most recent report: “The gross tax gap is the amount of true tax 
liability that is not paid voluntarily and timely. The estimated gross tax gap is $458 billion. The 
net tax gap is the gross tax gap less tax that will be subsequently collected, either paid voluntarily 
or as the result of IRS administrative and enforcement activities; it is the portion of the gross tax 
gap that will not be paid. It is estimated that $52 billion of the gross tax gap will eventually be 
collected resulting in a net tax gap of $406 billion. The voluntary compliance rate (VCR) is a ratio 
measure of relative compliance and is defined as the amount of tax paid voluntarily and timely 
divided by total true tax, expressed as a percentage. The VCR corresponds to the gross tax gap. 
The estimated VCR is 81.7 percent. The net compliance rate (NCR) is a ratio measure 
corresponding to the net tax gap. The NCR is defined as the sum of ‘tax paid voluntarily and 
timely’ and ‘enforced and other late payments’ divided by ‘total true tax’, expressed as a 
percentage. The estimated NCR is 83.7 percent.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GAP ESTIMATES 
FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010 at 1 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax%20 
gap%20estimates%20for%202008%20through%202010.pdf [https://perma.cc/979X-2QN5]. 
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substituting another’s judgment for one’s own, even when the other’s 
competence may equal or exceed one’s own, and even when the other is not 
human. 
In articulating the standards of professional responsibility for CPAs and 
tax lawyers, the hard problem is that AI will be useful to them exactly to the 
extent it approaches or exceeds their quality of function. In other words, AI 
will be useful to the extent they can rely on it as a substitute for their own 
work. But the problem is not as novel as it may seem. No one suggests that 
professionalism requires accountants to work out by hand or abacus the 
calculations in their Excel spreadsheets. Nor does anyone suggest lawyers 
second-guess their Lexis or Westlaw search results by double-checking their 
research with library books. 
These and countless other technologies professionals rely upon without 
controversy because, due to the reputation of these products and their long-
term and wide-spread use, reliance on the products is professionally 
appropriate. That no one marvels at their wizardry is not evidence that the 
products are not marvelously powerful and useful, but, rather simply, that 
they have become commonplace. Perhaps in fifty years, our professional 
descendants will no more marvel at what AI has become than we marvel at 
Excel or Lexis. That seems likely once we consider that our professional 
ancestors fifty years back would no doubt marvel at what we can do in our 
palms. 
Yet the burden to begin articulating appropriate standards for using AI is 
on this generation because we will be the first to use it. The starting point is 
recognizing what AI has in common with technologies that are indisputably 
reasonable for professionals to use. We do not doubt it is appropriate for 
professionals to use spreadsheets and databases, though we expect them to 
use ones with good reputations for quality and to use them correctly and to 
understand something of their designs and limits. And this is what we should 
expect of professionals using AI. 
AI as imagined and predicted is, however, distinguishable from the 
technologies currently used. It is not merely that the shine and novelty has 
worn off those technologies. The promise of AI is to do more: it is to deliver 
advice almost equivalent, if not equivalent, to a human expert’s. The concern 
at hand is to articulate how tax professionals should use it. But the problem 
may not be as novel as it first seems. CPAs and tax lawyers have professional 
standards for how to use advice given them by other humans. Ignoring the 
temptation to focus on the source of the completed work product being either 
human or digital, the standards for determining when it is reasonable for a 
professional to rely upon another professional’s advice are the most 
analogous to the use of AI we expect—and hope or fear—will emerge. 
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B. Professional Responsibility Standards 
1. Federal Standards: Taxpayer Penalties 
To discuss the professional duties of tax professionals, it is useful to 
introduce the legal duties of their clients, the taxpayers. The U.S. federal 
income tax system is one of self-reporting. The government does not provide 
taxpayers with bills, but rather taxpayers are obligated to file a return they 
believe to be true and correct in all material matters.160 The taxpayer is 
responsible for gathering the relevant facts and applying the relevant law to 
determine and report the liability for the year. Generally, the annual return 
does not describe the legal argument behind a taxpayer’s characterization 
(e.g., that the expense is deductible).161 Nor, generally, does it require 
providing underlying information (e.g., receipts) with the return, though the 
taxpayer has the duty to keep adequate books and records to substantiate what 
was reported.162 Once the return is filed, it is subject to an automated review, 
which checks for mathematical errors and compares the information on the 
return with information the IRS has obtained elsewhere, and also assesses the 
likelihood of errors on the return.163  
If the review by the IRS determines the taxpayer understated the liability 
due, and the taxpayer acquiesces in the determination or a court upholds it, 
the taxpayer must pay the additional tax along with interest.164 However, the 
taxpayer may not necessarily be subjected to penalties. A taxpayer who was 
 
160. On the government providing ready returns to taxpayers, see Joseph Bankman, Simple 
Filing for Average Citizens: The California ReadyReturn, 107 TAX NOTES 1431, 1431 (2005); 
Mock & Shurtz, supra note 77, at 529. But see Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph 
Kramden, and the Civic Virtues of a Tax Return Filing Requirement, 61 TAX L. REV. 53 (2007); 
William Ahern, “ReadyReturn” a Bad Idea That’s Hard To Kill, TAX FOUND. (2009), 
https://taxfoundation.org/readyreturn-bad-idea-thats-hard-kill/ [https://perma.cc/54UG-43W5]. 
161. For example, a sole proprietor would deduct reasonable compensation in the expenses 
line on their Schedule C, line 26. The 2018 Schedule C instructions for line 26 only require the 
taxpayer to reduce the amount by enumerated credits where applicable. No analysis on the amount 
is otherwise required. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2018 INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE C, C-9 
(2018). 
162. 26 U.S.C. § 6001 (2018) requires taxpayers to maintain records to substantiate their 
returns though they don’t necessarily have to turn those records in with their return. For example, 
a person claiming a charitable deduction would enter the amount they gave in cash on Schedule 
A, line 11. The instructions for Schedule A, however, explicitly state that the taxpayer should not 
attach receipts to substantiate the amount, but rather, merely keep the records. INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., 2018 INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE A, A-10 (2018). 
163. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 106, at 2. 
164. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6651–63 provide for non-penalty additions to tax. For an explanation, see 
MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 55:1, 55:7–8 (Hersel Shadian ed., 2018). 
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not negligent in the return-filing process and whose understated liability was 
not substantial will not be penalized.165 
Internal Revenue Code section 6662 provides the penalty structure for 
taxpayers who were negligent, substantially understated the income tax 
liability, or claimed tax benefits from a transaction that lacked economic 
substance.166 There are exceptions to the penalties for both negligence and 
substantial understatement of liabilities, but the penalty for claiming benefits 
from transactions without economic substance cannot be avoided.167 
If the taxpayer’s position has a “reasonable basis,” even though it was 
incorrect, then the taxpayer will not be considered negligent.168 The Treasury 
Regulations describe the reasonable basis standard as “a relatively high 
standard of tax reporting, that is, significantly higher than not frivolous or not 
patently improper.”169 Informally, a position with a reasonable basis is often 
said to have a 10% to 20% chance of success on the merits, if litigated.170 
The taxpayer is at risk of an understatement penalty only if the 
understatement is substantial.171 But even if the understatement is substantial, 
the taxpayer will be protected from penalty in several situations. First is if the 
position had a reasonable basis and was disclosed to the IRS when the return 
was filed. Second is if the position had “substantial authority,” even if it was 
not disclosed to the IRS.172 “Substantial authority” is as an objective measure 
of the weight of authorities in favor of the position.173 Informally, positions 
with substantial authority are often said to have at least a 40% chance of 
 
 165. MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 164, § 55:6. 
166. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b)(1) (2018) (indicating negligence and disregard of rules or 
regulations), (2) (indicating substantial understatement), and (6) (indicating tax benefits claimed 
from transaction lacking economic substance). Id. § 6662 imposes several other penalties. For 
example, 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b)(3) penalizes substantial valuation misstatements. Id. § 6663(a) 
imposes a hefty penalty where an underpayment is due to fraud. Id. § 7206 imposes monetary and 
criminal sanctions for fraud in some circumstances. 
167. The penalty for claiming tax benefits from transactions that lack economic substance 
cannot be avoided once the transaction has been determined to lack economic substance. 26 
U.S.C. § 6664(c)(2), (d)(2) (2018). On the codification into the penalty regime of this long-time, 
court-created doctrine, see Richard M. Lipton, ‘Codification’ of the Economic Substance 
Doctrine—Much Ado About Nothing?, 112 J. TAX’N 325, 325 (2010). 
168. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3(b)(1) (2018) provides that a return position with a “reasonable 
basis” is not attributable to negligence. 
169. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2018). 
170. See Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., The Range of Legal Tax Opinions, with Emphasis on the 
‘Should’ Opinion, 98 TAX NOTES 1125 (2003). 
171. Generally, 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(1) (2018) defines an understatement as substantial if it 
is greater than 10% of the correct amount or $5,000, except in the case of corporations. For 
corporations, the understatement exceeds the lesser of (i) 10% of the correct amount (or $10,000, 
if greater) or (ii) $10,000,000. 
 172. CUMMINGS, supra note 170. 
 173. Id. 
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success on the merits.174 Neither a disclosed position with a reasonable basis 
nor a position with substantial authority will protect the taxpayer if a tax 
shelter was involved.175 If a tax shelter was involved, then the position must 
have had substantial authority, and the taxpayer must have believed the 
position was more likely than not to prevail (i.e., had a greater than 50% 
chance of success) in order for the taxpayer to avoid the penalty.176 
There is another defense for the taxpayer whose understatement did not 
involve a tax shelter or a transaction without economic substance. Even if 
there was negligence or a substantial understatement, the taxpayer will not be 
penalized if “it [can be] shown that there was a reasonable cause” and “the 
taxpayer acted in good faith.”177 The Treasury Regulations provide this is 
determinable on “a case-by-case basis, taking into account all pertinent facts 
and circumstances,” including the “experience, knowledge, and education of 
the taxpayer” and, most importantly, “the extent of the taxpayer’s effort.”178 
Reliance on information, such as W-2 forms or valuation provided by others, 
may have been reasonable and in good faith, as reliance on the advice or 
opinion of a professional may have been. 179 With respect to the last, the 
taxpayer’s “education, sophistication and business experience” is relevant as 
is whether the taxpayer should have known the advisor lacked appropriate 
knowledge of tax law and the facts (e.g., if the taxpayer failed to inform the 
advisor of certain facts).180 
2. Federal Standards: Tax Return Preparer Penalties 
The standards for tax return preparers reflect the penalty standards for 
taxpayers.181 Generally, if a tax return preparer prepares a return resulting in 
an understatement, then the position causing the understatement needs to 
have had a reasonable basis and been disclosed or have had substantial 
 
174. See id. 
175. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (2018). A tax shelter includes any plan if a significant 
purpose is the avoidance or evasion of federal income tax. Id. This definition of tax shelter has 
been criticized. See Hatfield, supra note 100, at 700–05. 
176. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4(g)(1), (f)(1) (2018). For corporate taxpayers, establishing this is 
necessary but insufficient to avoid the penalty while for non-corporate taxpayers it is sufficient. 
This regulation appears based on a prior but not the current statute. Both of these exceptions are 
part of the reasonable cause exception for underpayments, and a corporate taxpayer must prove 
the reasonable cause exception applies. GALLER AND LANG, supra note 4, at 53–54. 
177. 26 U.S.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2018). 
178. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (2018). 
179. Id. 
180. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1) (2018). 
181. For a discussion of the development of the standards and the changes from the 
professional standards, see GALLER & LANG, supra note 4, at 150–58. 
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authority so that the preparer escapes penalty.182 If the position involved a tax 
shelter, then the preparer needs to have reasonably believed it was more likely 
than not to succeed in order to escape penalty.183 
As with taxpayers, there is also a reasonable cause exception: even if the 
incorrect return position did not satisfy the appropriate standard, the preparer 
will not be penalized so long as the understatement was due to reasonable 
cause and the preparer acted in good faith.184 In determining whether or not 
there was reasonable cause and good faith, the Treasury Regulations provide 
that all the facts and circumstances are relevant, including whether the 
provision was “complex, uncommon, or highly technical,” and whether the 
normal office procedures of the preparer promoted accuracy and consistency 
in such a way that errors like the one in question would be rare.185 The 
Treasury Regulations explicitly provide that a preparer may, with reasonable 
cause and good faith, rely on the advice of another return preparer or other 
advisor without verifying the advice or information so long as: (i) the preparer 
had reason to believe the other party was competent to give the advice or 
information; (ii) the advice or information is not unreasonable on its face; (iii) 
the other party was aware of all relevant facts (so far as the preparer knew or 
should have known); (iv) there were no intervening developments of the law 
that would make the advice unreliable; and (v) the return preparer makes 
reasonable inquiries if what is provided (or its implications) appears incorrect 
or incomplete.186 
These penalties apply to “tax return preparers,” but that definition is 
sufficiently broad to include professionals who never see the return.187 The 
division between planner and preparer is the time at which advice is given.188 
 
182. 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a) (2018). The return preparer may also be penalized in more 
egregious situations too, of course. For example, anyone who prepares tax-related documents that 
are “fraudulent” or “false as to any material matter” may be committing a felony under 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7206(2), even if the false statement is not material to calculating the tax liability. United States 
v. Abbas, 504 F.2d 123, 126 (9th Cir. 1974). There are many I.R.C. sections that impose criminal 
sanctions. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201–17 (2018). 
183. 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a)(2)(C) (2018). This also applies to “reportable transactions” under 
26 U.S.C. § 6662A. 
184. 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a)(3) (2018). 
185. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6694-2(e)(1), (4) (2018). 
186. Id. §§ 1.6694-1(e)(1), -2(e) (2018). 
187. If less than 5% of the aggregate time incurred by the advisor with respect to the position 
is after the events have occurred, he or she will not be considered a non-signing preparer. This is 
a de minimis safe harbor. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(36) (2018); 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-15(b)(2)(i) 
(2018). It is also necessary that the position is related to a financially substantial amount. 26 
C.F.R. § 301.7701–15(b)(3) (2018). For a discussion, see BORIS BITTKER, MARTIN MCMAHON & 
LAWRENCE ZELENAK, Tax Return Preparers, in FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 
¶ 46.03 (2018). 
 188. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELANAK, supra note 187. 
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So long as the tax advice is given before the relevant transaction occurs, the 
professional is an ex ante tax planner and not an ex post return preparer.189 
However, a material amount of tax advice after the transaction occurs may 
make the ex ante advisor into a “non-signing return preparer,” even if he or 
she never sees the return.190 
Indirectly, however, the return preparer penalty standards guide all 
responsible ex ante tax planning professionals. First, of course, sometimes 
the tax planner will prepare and file the return. Second, even if an advisor 
will not prepare the return and does not anticipate providing advice after the 
plan is implemented, there is always the chance that follow-up advice will be 
needed by the client or the return preparer. And this can transform an advisor 
into a non-signing return preparer. Finally, when giving tax advice, a planner 
presumes his or her advice will be eventually reflected on the client’s return, 
and the client will be subjected to penalties if there is an understatement and 
the position did not meet the requisite confidence (and perhaps disclosure) 
level.191 
3. Federal Standards: Circular 230 
It is not only through these I.R.C. provisions and their regulation of return 
preparers that the federal government regulates tax professionals. Congress 
has authorized the IRS to regulate all who “practice before” it.192 As 
mentioned above, this includes CPAs and lawyers who give written tax 
advice, even though, perhaps counter-intuitively, it does not cover return 
 
 189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. AICPA Statement on Standards for Tax Services (SSTS) No 7, Form and Content of 
Advice to Taxpayers: Statement 3 (“A member should assume that tax advice provided to a 
taxpayer will affect the manner in which the matters or transactions considered would be reported 
or disclosed on the tax return. Therefore, for tax advice given to a taxpayer, the member should 
consider, when relevant (a) return reporting and disclosure standards applicable to the related tax 
return position and (b) the potential penalty consequences of the return position.”). 
192. 31 U.S.C. § 330 provides the Secretary of the Treasury this authority with respect to 
those practice before the Department of the Treasury. The IRS is an agency within the Treasury 
Department. 
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preparers as such.193 The Treasury Regulations governing these tax 
professionals is known as “Circular 230.”194 
While, for the most part, Circular 230 imposes standards for return 
preparation that reflect those the I.R.C. imposes on taxpayers and returner 
preparers, practitioners only violate those standards through willfulness, 
recklessness, or gross incompetence.195 However there is nothing in the 
I.R.C. similar to Circular 230’s regulation of written advice. Circular 230 
regulates written advice on any “federal tax matter,” which is any “matter 
concerning the application or interpretation of” any law or regulation 
administered by the IRS.196 In writing its advice, the tax professional must 
use reasonable efforts to ascertain all the relevant facts and take them into 
consideration when relating the law to the facts, making reasonable 
assumptions, as appropriate, and not relying on information provided by 
others, if it would be unreasonable.197 There is a specific provision regarding 
 
193. 31 C.F.R. § 10.2(a)(4) (2018) (“Practice before the Internal Revenue Service 
comprehends all matters connected with a presentation to the Internal Revenue Service or any of 
its officers or employees relating to a taxpayer’s rights, privileges, or liabilities under laws or 
regulations administered by the Internal Revenue Service. Such presentations include, but are not 
limited to, preparing documents; filing documents; corresponding and communicating with the 
Internal Revenue Service; rendering written advice with respect to any entity, transaction, plan 
or arrangement, or other plan or arrangement having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion; 
and representing a client at conferences, hearings, and meetings.”) (emphasis added). 
194. For a history of Circular 230, see Bryan T. Camp, ‘Loving’ Return Preparer Regulation, 
140 TAX NOTES 457, 457–62 (2013). 
195. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (2018) (standards with respect to tax returns). After the IRS was 
denied the authority to regulate tax return preparers as such, see Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 
(2014), it is not clear how the return preparation standards apply to CPAs and lawyers who, other 
than by preparing the return would not be considered to be practicing before the IRS under 
§ 10.2(a)(4). GALLER & LANG, supra note 4, at 96. 
196. 31 C.F.R. § 10.37(d) (2019) (“A Federal tax matter, as used in this section, is any matter 
concerning the application or interpretation of (1) A revenue provision as defined in 
§ 6110(i)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code; (2) Any provision of law impacting a person’s 
obligations under the internal revenue laws and regulations, including but not limited to the 
person’s liability to pay tax or obligation to file returns; or (3) Any other law or regulation 
administered by the I.R.S.”). 
197. Id. § 10.37(a)(2) (2018) (“The practitioner must—(i) Base the written advice on 
reasonable factual and legal assumptions (including assumptions as to future events); (ii) 
Reasonably consider all relevant facts and circumstances that the practitioner knows or reasonably 
should know; (iii) Use reasonable efforts to identify and ascertain the facts relevant to written 
advice on each Federal tax matter; (iv) Not rely upon representations, statements, findings, or 
agreements (including projections, financial forecasts, or appraisals) of the taxpayer or any other 
person if reliance on them would be unreasonable; (v) Relate applicable law and authorities to 
facts; and (vi) Not, in evaluating a [f]ederal tax matter, take into account the possibility that a tax 
return will not be audited or that a matter will not be raised on audit.”). 
1102 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
 
the professional’s reliance on the advice of others.198 It allows reliance when 
it is reasonable and in good faith.199 It will not be in good faith if the 
practitioner knows or reasonably should know that the advice is unreliable or 
that the person is not competent.200 In applying these requirements, the IRS 
will consider what a reasonable practitioner would have done.201 
Echoing codes of professional responsibility, Circular 230 imposes 
requirements of due diligence (§ 10.22) and competence (§ 10.35). As for the 
latter, the practitioner must have “the appropriate level of knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness, and preparation,” and can acquire such through consultation 
with others or study.202 Practitioners are required to exercise due diligence, 
but they will be presumed to have done so when relying on the work of 
another person so long as “the practitioner used reasonable care in engaging, 
supervising, training, and evaluating the person.”203 
 
198. Id. § 10.37(b) (2018) (“Reliance on advice of others. A practitioner may only rely on 
the advice of another person if the advice was reasonable and the reliance is in good faith 
considering all the facts and circumstances. Reliance is not reasonable when—(1) The practitioner 
knows or reasonably should know that the opinion of the other person should not be relied on; (2) 
The practitioner knows or reasonably should know that the other person is not competent or lacks 
the necessary qualifications to provide the advice; or (3) The practitioner knows or reasonably 




201. 31 C.F.R. § 10.37(c)(1) (2018) (“(c) Standard of review. (1) In evaluating whether a 
practitioner giving written advice concerning one or more [f]ederal tax matters complied with the 
requirements of this section, the Commissioner, or delegate, will apply a reasonable practitioner 
standard, considering all facts and circumstances, including, but not limited to, the scope of the 
engagement and the type and specificity of the advice sought by the client.”). 
202. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(a) (2018) (“A practitioner must possess the necessary competence to 
engage in practice before the Internal Revenue Service. Competent practice requires the 
appropriate level of knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation necessary for the matter for 
which the practitioner is engaged. A practitioner may become competent for the matter for which 
the practitioner has been engaged through various methods, such as consulting with experts in the 
relevant area or studying the relevant law.”). 
203. 31 C.F.R. § 10.22 (2018) (“(a) In general. A practitioner must exercise due diligence—
(1) In preparing or assisting in the preparation of, approving, and filing tax returns, documents, 
affidavits, and other papers relating to Internal Revenue Service matters; (2) In determining the 
correctness of oral or written representations made by the practitioner to the Department of the 
Treasury; and (3) In determining the correctness of oral or written representations made by the 
practitioner to clients with reference to any matter administered by the Internal Revenue Service. 
(b) Reliance on others. Except as modified by §§ 10.34 and 10.37, a practitioner will be presumed 
to have exercised due diligence for purposes of this section if the practitioner relies on the work 
product of another person and the practitioner used reasonable care in engaging, supervising, 
training, and evaluating the person, taking proper account of the nature of the relationship between 
the practitioner and the person.”). 
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4. Professional Association Standards: ABA and AICPA 
CPAs and lawyers are also regulated by their professional associations. 
For lawyers, the ABA has issued its Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
which have been adopted (in some form or another) in almost every 
jurisdiction.204 It is the jurisdiction that has the authority to regulate and 
discipline lawyers, not the ABA, though the ABA does issue opinions on 
professional responsibility situations that may be persuasive to the local 
bars.205 
For lawyers, the first rule for professional conduct is competence: “A 
lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”206 This includes 
using “methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent 
practitioners.”207 In some situations, the competent lawyer may need to 
involve the services of another lawyer.208 This is permitted if the lawyer 
“reasonably believe[s] that the other lawyers’ services will contribute to the 
competent and ethical representation of the client.”209 The reasonableness 
will depend, in part, upon the education, experience, and reputation of the 
other lawyer and the nature of the services assigned to him or her.210 A lawyer 
is also required to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness.”211 This 
latter requirement has been taken to mean that not only will the lawyer be 
 
204. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S 
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1-1(e)(4) (2018–2019 ed.). 
205. GALLER & LANG, supra note 4, at 7. 
206. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
207. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“Competent 
handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements 
of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent 
practitioners.”). 
 208. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“Before a 
lawyer retains or contracts with other lawyers outside the lawyer’s own firm to provide or assist 
in the provision of legal services to a client, the lawyer should ordinarily obtain informed consent 
from the client and must reasonably believe that the other lawyers’ services will contribute to the 
competent and ethical representation of the client. See also Rules 1.2 (allocation of authority), 1.4 
(communication with client), 1.5(e) (fee sharing), 1.6 (confidentiality), and 5.5(a) (unauthorized 
practice of law). The reasonableness of the decision to retain or contract with other lawyers 
outside the lawyer’s own firm will depend upon the circumstances, including the education, 
experience and reputation of the nonfirm lawyers; the nature of the services assigned to the 
nonfirm lawyers; and the legal protections, professional conduct rules, and ethical environments 
of the jurisdictions in which the services will be performed, particularly relating to confidential 
information.”). 
209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
211. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A lawyer shall act 
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”). 
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timely but also exhibit an appropriate zealousness, and “devote the resources 
needed to complete the job.”212 
Not surprisingly, given that tax is a specialization of a small number of 
lawyers, the Model Rules do not explicitly address the role of tax planners. 
In the past, the ABA has issued formal opinions on the duties of tax lawyers 
when advising as to return positions.213 However, the last such opinion was 
issued in 1985 and substantial changes to the penalty regimes over the past 
three decades have not prompted a revision.214 Accordingly, as a practical 
matter, tax lawyers are guided by the I.R.C. return preparer regime and 
Circular 230 rather than the Model Rules when providing return position or 
planning advice.215 
5. Professional Association Standards: The AICPA 
Like the ABA, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) has issued a code of professional responsibility.216 However, unlike 
the ABA, the AICPA has authority to discipline its members, which it usually 
does in conjunction with relevant state accountancy boards.217 
 
212. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 204, at § 1-3.1; see also MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1, 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A lawyer should pursue a matter on 
behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and 
take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. 
A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal 
in advocacy upon the client's behalf. . . . [3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely 
resented than procrastination.”). 
213. See generally Hatfield, supra note 100, at 683–98, for the history of ABA Formal 
Opinions 314 and 85–352. 
214. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85–352 (1985) 
(requiring positions on a return to have a realistic possibility of success on the merits). This 
position is understood to be greater than the reasonable basis standard but lesser than the 
substantial authority standard applied by 26 U.S.C. § 6694 (2018) and 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (2014). 
GALLER & LANG, supra note 4, at 154–55. 
 215. GALLER & LANG, supra note 4, at 155. 
 216. Id. 
217. The only states in which enforcement is not joint are Arizona, California, Florida, Iowa, 
and New Mexico.  AICPA/State Board of Accountancy Cooperative Enforcement available at 
https://www.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/interestareas/professionalethics/resources/ethicsenforc
ement/downloadabledocuments/aicpa-state-board-cooperative-enforcement.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/JEV7-GTCZ]. See generally, AICPA JOINT ETHICS ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM (AM. INST. OF 
CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, 2019) (Joint Ethics Enforcement Program § 1.8 “The purpose of 
the JEEP [(Joint Ethics Enforcement Program)]  agreement between the AICPA and a state 
society is to permit a single investigation of a joint member to enforce the respective codes and, 
if warranted, have a single settlement agreement or joint trial board hearing. JEEP also permits 
state societies to allow the AICPA to investigate state society members who are not also AICPA 
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CPAs are obligated to provide “due care” for their clients.218 This 
obligation requires both competence and due diligence.219 However, unlike 
the model rules for lawyers, the AICPA provides specific guidance for return 
preparation and tax advice. With respect to return preparation, a CPA is to 
comply with the reporting and disclosure standards of the applicable taxing 
authority, which would be the I.R.C. penalty regime and Circular 230 when 
preparing a federal income tax return.220 As to tax advice that is not return 
preparation, the CPA is supposed to ensure that the advice “reflects 
competence and serves the taxpayer’s needs” and complies with the 
requirements of the taxing authority.221 The CPA is told to assume that tax 
advice will affect how the return is prepared, so the return preparation 
standards should be considered.222 The AICPA guides CPAs in their use of 
other professionals’ opinions when giving tax advice: consider the 
knowledge and expertise of other professionals, as well as the relevance and 
 
members.”) available at https://www.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/interestareas/professional 
ethics/resources/ethicsenforcement/downloadabledocuments/jeepmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
JTF6-CYMC]. 
218. AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 0.300.060 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. 
ACCOUNTANTS, 2014) (“Due Care. 01 Due care principle. A member should observe the 
profession’s technical and ethical standards, strive continually to improve competence and the 
quality of services, and discharge professional responsibility to the best of the member’s ability. 
02 The quest for excellence is the essence of due care. Due care requires a member to discharge 
professional responsibilities with competence and diligence. It imposes the obligation to perform 
professional services to the best of a member’s ability, with concern for the best interest of those 
for whom the services are performed, and consistent with the profession’s responsibility to the 
public.”). 
219. Id. 
220. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON STANDARDS FOR TAX 
SERVICES (SSTS), NO. 1, Tax Return Positions: STATEMENT 4 (2019) (“A member should 
determine and comply with the standards, if any, that are imposed by the applicable taxing 
authority with respect to recommending a tax return position, or preparing or signing a tax 
return.”). 
221. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON STANDARDS FOR TAX 
SERVICES (SSTS), NO. 7, Form and Content of Advice to Taxpayers: STATEMENT 2 (2019) (“A 
member should use professional judgment to ensure that tax advice provided to a taxpayer reflects 
competence and appropriately serves the taxpayer’s needs. When communicating tax advice to a 
taxpayer in writing, a member should comply with relevant taxing authorities’ standards, if any, 
applicable to written tax advice. A member should use professional judgment about any need to 
document oral advice. A member is not required to follow a standard format when communicating 
or documenting oral advice.”). 
222. Id. at 3 (“A member should assume that tax advice provided to a taxpayer will affect the 
manner in which the matters or transactions considered would be reported or disclosed on the 
taxpayer’s tax returns. Therefore, for tax advice given to a taxpayer, a member should consider, 
when relevant (a) return reporting and disclosure standards applicable to the related tax return 
position and (b) the potential penalty consequences of the return position. In ascertaining 
applicable return reporting and disclosure standards, a member should follow the standards in 
Statement on Standards for Tax Services No. 1, Tax Return Positions.”). 
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persuasiveness of the opinion, assessing whether the conclusion of the 
opinion is supported by the authorities.223 
6. Malpractice Standards 
When a tax professional fails to fulfill an appropriate standard, the 
consequences may include not only discipline by the relevant authority but, 
if the client is injured, a potential malpractice suit.224 As a practical matter, in 
tax malpractice suits, CPAs and tax lawyers are held to the same standard.225 
The standard is the level of care normally exercised by professionals in 
similar circumstances.226 Even though the rules of professional associations 
are drafted for professional discipline, courts may consider them in 
malpractice litigation initiated by aggrieved (former) clients.227 In litigation, 
whether or not the tax professional met the standard will be determined by 
experts testifying as to what competent professionals in similar circumstances 
would have done.228 
C. The Professional Standard for Using AI in Tax Planning 
Having surveyed the professional standards for tax planning, we can turn 
again to considering how AI for tax planning might function in the future. 
Being fed as many facts as available on the client’s situation, and perhaps 
itself continuously gathering those facts in real time, AI would detect patterns 
that are legally relevant and patterns that provide planning opportunities, 
even though those patterns may not have been spotted by the professional.229 
 
223. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 220 at 6 (“A member should 
determine and comply with the standards, if any, that are imposed by the applicable taxing 
authority with respect to recommending a tax return position, or preparing or signing a tax 
return.”). 
224. While civil actions for tax malpractice may be based in either tort or contract, the two 
standards are practically the same. See Jacob L. Todres, Tax Malpractice Damages: A 
Comprehensive Review of the Elements and the Issues, 61 TAX LAW. 705, 708 (2008) (exploring 
the elements and the proper measure of damages in tax malpractice litigation).   . 
225. “While there might be some theoretical benefit in attempting to analyze the professions 
separately, the pragmatic truth is that the dividing line between the professions with respect to tax 
work has never been clear.” Id. at 707. 
226. Id. at 709. 
227.  Some courts have held that the ethics rules define professional duties as a matter of law, 
though a violation of those rules does not give rise to a cause of action in and of itself. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(2) cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1986).  
228. DAMIAN D. CAPOZZOLA, EXPERT WITNESSES IN CIVIL TRIALS: EFFECTIVE PREPARATION 
AND PRESENTATION § 2:36 (2018). 
 229. See supra text accompanying notes 136–40. 
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AI would similarly sort through the legal authorities and planning 
commentaries to determine relevance and opportunities, and relate the laws 
and facts, estimating and generating and predicting facts when need be, to 
devise a tax minimization plan.230 As part of the process, AI would be able to 
determine the probability of success if litigated, as, indeed, even the earliest 
generation of tax research AI does this.231 The result would be delivered to 
the tax professional along with a conclusion that it has no more than a 
reasonable basis (and should be disclosed) or as much as substantial authority 
or even that it is reasonable to believe the plan is more likely than not to 
succeed.232 Ideally, the AI would also determine if the plan has economic 
substance.233 
We concluded earlier that considering when it is professionally 
appropriate for tax professionals to rely upon another professional’s advice 
would be revealing for determining how they should use AI in tax planning.234 
In reviewing the professional obligations of CPAs and tax lawyers, we read 
that standards for competence and diligence, as well as the I.R.C. taxpayer 
and return preparer penalty regimes, acknowledge the propriety of relying on 
the advice or opinions of others.235 Tax return preparers may rely on the 
advice of other professionals and escape penalties even when the incorrect 
positions they advised lacked so much as a reasonable basis.236 Circular 230’s 
standards for competence and diligence both consider it appropriate to use 
others: competence can involve consulting with other professionals, and 
diligence can involve relying on the work of others.237 The first rule of ethics 
for lawyers, competence, may require the lawyer to involve the services of 
another lawyer.238 As for CPAs, it is presumed they may work with other 
professionals in advising clients.239 
In sum, the tax professional is permitted to rely on the advice of another 
when doing so would be reasonable and good faith. But what does that mean? 
First, it means that the professional has no reason to doubt the adequacy of 
the advice.240 The advice does not appear unreasonable on its face; it 
considers the relevant facts and law; and the professional has no reason to 
 
230. See supra text accompanying notes 136–40. 
231. See supra text accompanying notes 122–24; see also Sorenson, supra note 88. 
232. See supra text accompanying notes 140–44. 
233. See supra text accompanying notes 140–44. 
234. See supra Part IV (A).  
235. See supra text accompanying notes 206–09 and note 223. 
236. See supra text accompanying notes 206–09 and note 223. 
237. See supra text accompanying notes 198–201. 
238. See supra text accompanying notes 206–09. 
239. See supra text accompanying note 223. 
 240. See supra text accompanying note 223. 
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consider it unreliable.241 Second, it means that the source of the advice is 
reasonably believed to be qualified and competent.242 This can be due to the 
professional’s care in engaging the person, or in assessing the person’s 
education, experience, and reputation.243 
Note why it is that a professional would be in the position of relying on 
another. First, it could be that the other professional is a member of the 
client’s team. For example, a client’s CPA and lawyer work together simply 
because the client has chosen each of them. Two other illustrations however 
are more apropos. A professional might engage another out of the duty of 
diligence. Due to workload or deadline pressure, for example, one lawyer 
may need another lawyer’s help. Or one might engage another out of the duty 
of competence. A competent professional knows his or her own limits of 
competence and qualification and knows when it is necessary to consult 
someone with greater expertise. 
The requirements for tax professionals using AI in tax planning should be 
articulated to reflect these standards. It is in the same situations that a CPA 
or tax lawyer would want to rely on AI: either out of need to be diligent or a 
lack of expertise. Just as with human experts, the tax professional should be 
able to rely on the AI even when he or she is unable to deliver as expert an 
opinion, or unable to do so without devoting a great deal more time which he 
or she may not have or for which the client may not be willing to pay. 
Just as with the rules for relying on the advice of another human 
professional, the tax professional should believe the AI to be reliable, 
generally, and the professional should have no reason to believe the AI’s 
work on a specific plan is unreasonable. But there are two practical 
difficulties. One is knowing that an AI application is reliable. If a tax 
professional is supposed to consider the education, experience, and reputation 
of a human professional before relying on his or her advice, what is analogous 
to consider for a computer program? This problem will be especially difficult 
for the early generations of AI adopters, and remain difficult as AI 
applications proliferate insofar as there most always will be a new application 
and one that may promise benefits unavailable with others and especially 
suited for the client’s needs. 
 
241. 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.6694-1(e)(1), -2(e); 31 C.F.R. § 10.37(b); SSTS INTERPRETATION NO. 
1–2, supra note 223. 
242. SSTS INTERPRETATION NO. 1–2, supra note 223. 
243. 31 C.F.R. § 10.22; AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 220; AM. 
INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON STANDARDS FOR TAX SERVICES (SSTS), 
NO. 2, Answers to Questions on Returns 8 (2019); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 
6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
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The second practical problem is knowing whether the AI-generated plan 
is unreasonable. This problem is one of degree, varying to the extent the AI’s 
expertise surpasses the professional. The professional may be unable to 
second-guess the AI. Of course, when relying on another human expert’s 
opinion, the professional may also be unable to second-guess it. That may be, 
after all, exactly why the second professional is being used—to provide a 
valuation or other specific expertise, for example. However, the tax 
professional is able to ask questions of the other professional, questions that 
reflect the professional’s education and experience as well as uncertainty; 
indeed, it is expected that the two professionals will discuss the opinion due 
to their having the same client objectives and familiarity with the facts but 
different professional perspectives. However, a CPA or lawyer using AI to 
generate a tax plan will not have the opportunity for that type of human 
dialogue, which is really an opportunity to have one’s questions answered 
and to learn from the greater expert and, indirectly, thereby improve one’s 
own competence. And if the professional is unable to do that, then he will be 
unable to adequately advise clients on the potential risks and rewards of the 
plan, having substituted artificial intelligence for his own. And, unlike, for 
example, when the lawyer can arrange for the valuation expert to discuss the 
opinion directly with the client, the tax professional presumably will not be 
sending the client directly to the computer for a better explanation. 
V. PROPOSAL FOR RESPONSIBLE USE OF AI IN TAX PLANNING 
A. Three Problems 
While the professional standards for using AI should be those for using 
another expert, the practical problems differ. One problem is the need to 
assess the reliability of the AI application, generally. The reasonableness 
standard for professionals refers to the practices of reasonable professionals: 
a competent and diligent professional is one that complies with the 
professional customs of competence and diligence.244 This is not problematic 
so long as there are, in fact, established customs. However, pioneers are 
always at risk. The early adopters of AI applications will be unable to comply 
with professional norms for determining the reliability of an applications as 
there will have been no widespread experience with those applications, much 
less customs for sorting the reliable from the unreliable. And individual 
professionals will never be in the position to sort all available applications. 
 
 244. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
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Individual professionals have limited time and energy and opportunities for 
doing so. The fundamental issue is how a duly cautious, self-regulating 
profession grows, adapting to new tools by articulating appropriate standards. 
A second problem is the need to assess the reasonableness of the specific 
AI-generated plan. To the extent the AI’s expertise exceeds the 
professional’s, the professional simply may be unable to spot weaknesses in 
the plan. If the professional is unable to do this, then he or she will be unable 
to accurately convey the potential risks and rewards to the client, which 
means the client will either forego near certain tax benefits or plunge itself 
forward with near certain tax penalties. When a tax professional considers the 
opinion of another human expert, the two discuss the opinion and its bases 
and the tax professional can ask and answer questions and, indeed, learn and 
be better able to advise the client. 
Thus, in order to use AI in a professionally responsible way, the tax 
professional needs three things. First: a means by which to determine the 
general quality and reliability of the AI application. Second is a means by 
which to identify weaknesses in the AI-generated plan when the plan extends 
beyond the professional’s current expertise. Third is a means by which to 
extend the professional’s understanding on the matters raised by the plan. The 
second and third problems need to be resolved so that the tax professional 
can appropriately advise the client, though, the resolution of these problems 
also benefit the tax professional by improving his or her own professional 
competence. 
B. Who Should Solve? 
Who should solve these three problems? Insofar as individual 
professionals are unable to do so, it is reasonable to consider the professional 
associations. Indeed, the professions are premised upon a substantial degree 
of self-regulation. The professions have an interest and a defining right to 
articulate their own standards of professional responsibility. 
But there are practical difficulties with the professional associations 
solving these problems. While both the ABA and the AICPA have produced 
comprehensive codes of professional conduct, neither is in the position to test 
AI tax planning programs and provide guidance on their appropriate use. For 
lawyers, tax is a relatively small specialization. And it is one in which the 
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has 
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shown little interest or understanding.245 This is the committee charged with 
issuing opinions to guide lawyers, and the committee that has not even 
updated its guidance on return preparation to reflect decades of changes in 
the laws.246 It is a committee whose previous applications of professional 
responsibility standards to tax lawyers have ignored the nature of tax practice 
and the suggestions of tax lawyers on what those standards should be.247  Even 
if the committee were to develop the capacity, inclination, and specialized 
expertise, the need to sort AI applications as they become available is not the 
type of work that the committee does.248 The committee issues formal 
opinions deduced from general principles; it does not opine very specifically, 
much less as specifically as would be useful for lawyers considering which 
AI applications to buy.249 While the tax committee may have both the 
inclination and expertise for this work, it does not have the capacity to 
undertake testing programs. It also lacks the authorization to issue formal 
ethics opinions. However, regardless of the committee jurisdiction, capacity, 
inclination, and expertise, the ABA as such has no disciplinary authority. 
While the ABA can articulate potentially persuasive professionalism 
positions, it is the IRS and state bars that regulate tax lawyers.250 And, at the 
state bar level, there are the same problems of limited interest in tax 
specialization and a greater lack of capacity to undertake the work, not to 
mention the risk that the dozens of state bars could adopt dozens of 
approaches. 
 
245. See ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ops. 314 and 85–352 
(1985), for a discussion of the tensions between the ABA professional responsibility committee 
and tax sections on issues related to the ethics of tax lawyering. See also Hatfield, supra note100, 
at 683–699. 
246. The Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility is the committee 
authorized to issue ethics opinions interpreting the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. These 
are called the “ABA Formal Opinions.” The last Formal Opinion for tax lawyers was 85–352. 
The Committee has since left tax lawyers without practical guidance. GALLER & LANG, supra 
note 4, at 155. 
247. See GALLER & LANG, supra note 4, at 155. 
 248. See Id. at 7–8. 
249. With respect to emerging technologies, the ABA has been circumspect. In 2012, it 
modified Comment 8 of Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules (competence). The modification said that 
lawyers should stay abreast of changes in technology. In 2017, ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 477R (2017) was issued: lawyers should use (unspecified but) 
reasonable efforts to secure communications about client matters. In 2018, ABA Comm. on Ethics 
& Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 477R (2018) was issued to advise lawyers they have duties 
to current clients in the event of a data breach (though the opinion took no position on the ethical 
duties of lawyers to former clients and non-clients). While there is some function to these types 
of opinions, the louder message is that (for, perhaps, very good reasons) the ABA is not going to 
commit itself to providing specific and practical advice. 
 250. GALLER & LANG, supra note 4, at 7–8. 
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The AICPA and the state accountancy boards, on the other hand, do have 
considerable interest and expertise in tax services provided by their CPAs. 
And, unlike the ABA, the AICPA does have disciplinary authority over its 
members.251 But, like the ABA, the AICPA has done a thorough job of 
producing a code of professional conduct but has never taken on the job of 
opining as to the grade of specific commercial products available for 
professionals to use, which is what CPAs would need to guide their AI 
purchases to ensure that their use would be professionally reasonable. 
The AICPA and the state accountancy boards also suffer from the same 
obvious limit of the ABA and state bars: none cover the scope of federal tax 
professionals. While both CPAs and lawyers may engage in advising on 
federal tax matters, it is only the IRS that regulates both. From the federal 
regulatory perspective, CPAs and tax lawyers comprise a single tax 
profession. The I.R.C. penalty provisions and Circular 230 make no 
distinction between CPAs and lawyers, and they apply the same standards 
and authorize the same penalties for failing to meet the standards.252 While 
the ABA professional committee’s indifference to these standards and 
penalties reflects its indifference to the peculiarities of tax practice, the 
AICPA acknowledges the authority of the IRS as federal taxing authority, 
requiring its members to adhere to the federal professional standards.253 
Though the IRS has the relevant legal authority to regulate the use of AI 
by tax professionals, there are significant obstacles. First is that it has an 
extraordinary range of tasks and extraordinarily limited resources.254 But even 
if it were granted sufficient resources for this particular task, its undertaking 
would be unavoidably and understandably controversial. It is undeniable that 
the IRS has the authority to regulate tax professionals, but it is undeniably 
problematic: the professionals responsible for arranging their clients’ affairs 
so as to pay the least tax are regulated by the agency responsible for collecting 
those taxes. After all, think of the criminal defense bar’s use of AI for defense 
planning being subject to the local police and prosecutors approving the 
particular AI program. The potential for AI to be extraordinarily good at 
 
251. Id. at 8. 
252. Circular 230 makes no distinction between professions. It uses the term “practitioner.” 
See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.22, .34–.35, .37 (2018). 
253. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 220. 
254. On the current budget woes of the IRS, see, for example, Emily Horton, 2018 Funding 
Bill Falls Short for the IRS, CENTER ON BUDGET POLICY AND PRIORITIES: OFF THE CHARTS (Mar. 
23, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/2018-funding-bill-falls-short-for-the-irs 
[https://perma.cc/A5GA-8HGK]. See also Jonathan Barry Forman & Roberta F. Mann, Making 
the Internal Revenue Service Work, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 725, 759–72 (2015), which describes 
suggestions to improve IRS performance in a time of deeper and seemingly never-ending budget 
cuts. 
51:1057] ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1113 
 
implementing the taxpayer’s right to contribute no more than necessary 
makes the regulation of AI by the agency authorized to compel those 
contributions inherently suspect. While tax advising and return preparation 
are not considered adversarial acts, the two may put the client on the course 
to controversy and litigation with the IRS, which is adversarial.255 This is a 
long discussed professional regulation problem in the tax field and not unique 
to the AI context.256 
C. The Proposal 
1. The Solution 
The solution to these problems could be delivered through a public-private 
professional certification regime.257 Tax planning AI developers would 
submit their applications to one or more privately organized panels that, for 
a fee, would test the application for reliability. These panels would be 
comprised of CPAs and tax lawyers. This would acknowledge the customary 
right of professionals to articulate professional norms, as well as the need of 
actual experts to determine if the products are, in fact, reliable. The panels 
would provide the AI with simulated problems and then assess its 
performance. Just as in malpractice cases where experts opine on what the 
established professional standards require in the instance case, the panel 
professionals would ultimately opine on whether the AI application is 
reliable. By investing significant time, running multiple scenarios, debating 
the results with one another, and consulting with computer and other experts, 
as necessary, the panel could accomplish what individual professionals never 
could, especially given that these panels would test multiple AI products over 
time. The panel reviews would feed back into the AI developers’ works, 
thereby increasing the quality of products as they are being developed. 
 
255. Of course, as described in ABA Formal Opinion 85–352, the return may be the first step 
in a relation that becomes adversarial. ABA Committee on Ethics & Professional Responsibility, 
supra note 214. 
256. As the Treasury Department increased its regulation of tax professionals in the 1980s, 
the New York State Bar Association Tax Section claimed the conflict-of-interest was unjustifiable 
and undermined the fundamental American right to adversarial challenges to the government. Tax 
Section, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Circular 230 and the Standards Applicable to Tax Shelter 
Opinions, 12 TAX NOTES 251, 261 (Feb. 9, 1981). Others agreed. Hatfield, supra note 100, at 
710–11. 
257. The need for AI software used in court to be validated has been discussed. See Karnow, 
supra note 3, at 177. 
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The panels can be envisioned to function somewhat as Underwriter’s 
Laboratory has with respect to fire safety and the Orthodox Union has with 
kosher food in the U.S.258 The demand for fire safety certification was fueled 
by insurance companies, local governments, the construction industry, and 
manufacturers.259 The result was the development of the Underwriter’s 
Laboratory to test products for fire safety.260 The demand for packaged foods 
in the 1950s translated into demands by religiously observant Jewish 
households for kosher certification agencies.261 The Orthodox Union 
provided rabbis to inspect industrial processing and packaging of foods and 
certify compliant products as kosher.262 Both the Underwriter’s Laboratory 
and the Orthodox Union were funded by fees paid by the manufacturers, and 
those fees covered the costs of developing, implementing, and enforcing 
regulations in situations in which the government was less equipped.263 
The manufacturers were willing to pay the fees only because there was a 
product demand for the certification. Product demand is essential for private 
certification to be funded and, thus, to succeed.264 The IRS would stimulate 
product demand for certification by providing a penalty defense for those 
 
258. William Merrill founded the Underwriters Lab (UL) after an initial study of building 
materials and electrical appliances funded by the National Board of Fire Underwriters in the wake 
of a series of fires throughout American cities. Timothy D. Lytton, Competitive Third-Party 
Regulation: How Private Certification Can Overcome Constraints that Frustrate Government 
Regulation, 15 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 539, 543 (2014). The results of the study were put forth in 
an “approved fittings and electrical devices” list and distributed to fire underwriters and municipal 
fire service officers. Id. at 544. The UL was founded shortly thereafter in 1901. Id. By 1916, it 
was financially independent and deriving income from companies paying for the testing to be 
done. Id. Eventually, insurance companies were conditioning policies on using UL approved 
materials and municipalities used UL standards in developing building codes. Id. at 544–45. In 
order to ensure continuing success, Merrill insisted on hiring the best experts and focusing on 
professionalism. Id. at 545. By employing a mix of people from insurance, government, and 
industry, the UL ensured that standards remained high. Id. In order to respond to competition and 
assuage any fears about the testing process, the UL took steps to be transparent by sharing 
complete reports with industry clients, producing lists of approved products, and allowing the 
public to visit their facilities. Id. at 547. On top of all of the organizational safeguards, Merrill 
also incubated a strong sense of mission that many employees and customers bought into. Id. at 
546. Today, over 22,000,000,000 products carry the UL logo. Id. at 548. 
The Orthodox Union (OU) turned the Kosher certification process into a highly organized 
operation from its roots as a part-time job for many rabbis. Id. at 550–51. To round out their 
personnel, OU trains them in food chemistry, food technology, customer relations, and 
professional ethics in addition to the necessary underlying Jewish dietary laws. Id. at 551. The 
OU gained dominance in the field by employing a multi-tiered structure. Id. at 552. 
259. Id. at 544–47. 
260. Id. 
261. Id. at 549. 
262. Id. at 550–51. 
263. See id. at 543–44, 549–50. 
264. Id. at 540. 
51:1057] ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1115 
 
professionals who used certified AI in good faith, though the resulting advice 
proved deficient. Providing this protection to tax professionals who used 
certified products would encourage both commercial AI developers and tax 
professionals to value the certification. This protection would be assured by 
the IRS for products that met the approval of the panel experts for substantive 
reliability and also for product requirements, such as product features aimed 
at aiding the tax professional in understanding the weaknesses and limits of 
the AI-generated advice. 
The integrity of the certification process would be guarded in two ways. 
The first is qualifying for panel membership only those with demonstrated 
substantial expertise and ethical propriety in their professional affairs. The 
panelists would be professionals with an extraordinary understanding and 
commitment to federal tax law, the self-reporting tax system, and the right 
regulation of tax practice. Second is that this certification regime would be 
overseen by the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), which is 
the IRS office on which Circular 230 confers exclusive responsibility for 
disciplining practitioners (including financial penalties, suspension, and 
disbarment).265 OPR investigates tax professionals when the IRS has assessed 
tax return preparer penalties as well as in situations in which IRS employees 
or others have provided information that justifies an investigation.266 
Accordingly, OPR will be in the best position to identify problems with AI 
being used as tax professionals, including detecting when AI certified by a 
particular panel should not have been. 
2. Implementing the Solution 
This proposal would be implemented by the Treasury Department through 
regulations under 26 U.S.C. § 6694 (return preparer regulations) and 
modifications to the Circular 230 regulations. As part of the process of 
issuing regulations, the Treasury Department, like all federal agencies, 
provides notice and receives comments.267 Through the notice and comment 
process, the ABA, AICPA, and state bars and accountancy boards would be 
encouraged to articulate concerns and provide suggestions so that the 
resulting penalty protection would be acceptable to professional disciplinary 
 
265. 31 C.F.R. § 10.1(a)(1) (2018) (authorizing OPR); 31 C.F.R. § 10.50 (2018) (sanctions 
available to OPR). 
266. On referrals to OPR, see Bryan E. Gates, IRM Abr.& Ann. § 4.11.55.5.1 (May 29, 2018). 
267. For an explanation of this process for federal agencies, see LEE MODJESKA, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4:3 (2018). 
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authorities.268 Ideally, a panel certification sufficient to protect tax 
professionals from IRS-imposed penalties would also protect them from 
sanctions by professional associations. The notice and comment process 
would be the opportunity for the professional associations and the federal 
government to cooperate. It also would be an opportunity for the ABA and 
other lawyers to provide suggestions to the Treasury Department that would 
make panel certification more likely to be relevant in professional 
malpractice litigation as well. A coordinated effort of these interested parties 
should stimulate product demand for the certification. 
In broad outline, what would these Treasury Regulations require? These 
Regulations would modify the I.R.C. § 6694(a)(3) reasonable cause and good 
faith exception to the return preparer penalties for understating tax liability.269 
This would expand Treasury Regulation § 1.6694-2(e).270 The modifications 
would provide that a return preparer’s good faith reliance on a certified AI 
application would be deemed reasonable. The return preparer would bear the 
burden of establishing the good faith use but would not bear the burden of 
establishing the quality of the AI. Similar modifications protecting any tax 
professional from using AI in his or her practice before the IRS, specifically 
including providing written advice on federal tax matters, would need to be 
made to Circular 230. These modifications would expand the reliance-on-
others provisions found in 31 C.F.R. § 10.22, which is the diligence 
obligation applicable to all aspects of practice before the IRS; 31 C.F.R. § 
10.35, which sets forth standards for all returns, documents, and other papers; 
and 31 C.F.R. § 10.37, which sets forth the requirements for written advice.271 
These new Treasury Regulations would create a registry of certified AI 
applications. OPR would establish an advisory committee of authorized 
practitioners under Circular 230 § 10.38, which authorizes OPR to establish 
advisory committees.272 This committee would function as the liaison 
between the certification panels and OPR, and also, as necessary, the ABA, 
the AICPA, other relevant professional associations, and the AI developers. 
This committee would monitor the certification activities of the panels and 
also the disciplinary proceedings against tax professionals who used AI 
certified products, making recommendations to improve the processes. 
The Treasury Regulations would establish the guidelines for the 
composition of panels. Panel members would be required to have certain 
 
268. Of course, the professional associations might also modify their codes of conduct or 
issue guidance to reflect the use of AI. 
269. 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a)(3) (2015). 
270. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6694-2(e) (2009). 
271. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.22, .35, .37 (2018). 
272. Id. § 10.38. 
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credentials, substantial experience, and an excellent reputation among other 
professionals and OPR. The panel members should meet the requirements to 
be experts in malpractice litigation in the jurisdictions in which they practice. 
Panels should have expertise in tax planning, compliance, audit, and 
litigation. The panels should have as consultants qualified appraisers, 
enrolled actuaries, and others commonly involved in tax practice, as well as 
computer scientists. Panels should include a mix of professionals with private 
tax experience and experience working within the IRS. The panels should 
reflect a geographical mix of experts, as well as experts from local, regional, 
and national firms. 
The Treasury Regulations would authorize the panels to charge fees for 
testing any computer program that is marketed on the basis of its ability to 
generate tax minimization plans customized to specific facts.273 Each panel 
would have wide discretion in determining the best way to test these 
programs, though the opinion of each panel member would need to be 
recorded and available to OPR.274 No panel would be permitted to certify an 
AI program unless a super-majority of its members voted to do so. Ideally, 
any dissent would be taken quite seriously with the aim of arriving at a 
consensus through further testing, review, and discussion. 
While the panels would have considerable operational discretion, 
certification would require a positive vote on five specific functions. The first 
would be substantive accuracy.275 For example, an AI program might 
generate a plan for a shareholder-employee of an S corporation to receive a 
certain dollar amount characterized as compensation and a certain dollar 
amount as a non-taxable dividend.276 The strategy of the plan would be to 
minimize total tax liability but without penalty risk. The AI program might 
conclude the plan is more likely than not to succeed.277 Each panel member 
would then vote on whether he or she would consider the advice appropriate 
and whether it would be reasonable to believe it to be more likely than not to 
succeed. 
 
273. This approach avoids the need to define AI. This approach is premised on the AI 
developer’s marketing claims. This approach may include products that may not usually be 
considered AI. However, any over-inclusiveness would not be problematic as the products would 
still be within the expertise of the panels, and it would allow product demand to develop for 
certifying less dazzling as well as more dazzling products. Defining AI is difficult and, in this 
situation, unnecessary. On the difficulty of defining AI, see supra notes 16–17 and accompanying 
text. 
274. If an AI application became involved in serious disciplinary cases prosecuted by the 
OPR, the identities of the particular panel members who voted to certify the application could 
become useful for disqualifying those individuals from panel membership. 
275. See supra text accompanying notes 230–32. 
276. See supra text accompanying notes 149–50. 
277. See supra text accompanying notes 182–83. 
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The second requirement is that the AI programs provide more than a bare 
conclusion. It would need to identify the facts it determined to be relevant 
and provide an assessment of how important certain facts are to its analysis.278 
For example, perhaps a very low compensation level to the shareholder-
employee was justified in large part because of the low educational 
credentials of the shareholder-employee.279 The critical nature of those facts 
to the tax plan would be highlighted and appropriately visualized.280 This 
would improve the professional’s understanding of the AI program and the 
plan and allow the professional to double-check important facts and have 
important conversations with the client.281 It may be, for example, that the 
 
278. Depending upon the design of the AI, this and related functions may be difficult to 
achieve. Some very powerful AI designs achieve remarkable results but are unable to effectively 
communicate to users how those results are achieved. The operations are within a black box. 
Efforts to make the processes more transparent may reduce the achievements.  See Calo, supra 
note 15, at 415; Karnow, supra note 3, at 142; Katz, supra note 23, at 918; Knight, supra note 3. 
279. See supra note 145. 
280. When data is visualized, it can have a large effect on our interpretation and even our 
mood. Something as simple as what type is used can have an impact on the ability to comprehend 
and engage with the words being written. KEVIN LARSON ET AL., PEOPLE AND COMPUTERS XX—
ENGAGE: MEASURING THE AESTHETICS OF READING 41, 49 (Nick Bryan-Kinns et al. eds., 2007). 
Data visualization has the ability to speed up the process by which our brains comprehend data in 
part because we can perceive patterns in a graph or series of graphs better than my looking at the 
data by which the graphs are drawn from. How Data Visualization Helps Your Brain Absorb 
Information, MTAB (last visited Oct.. 15, 2019), https://www.mtab.com/data-visualization-helps-
brain-absorb-information/ [https://perma.cc/Z633-UMMS]. Graphs and pie charts are great tools 
for visualizing data in a format easy to grasp when looking at data sets. However, in the age of 
Blue-J and that program’s ability to render, and visualize, a prediction by pumping out a simple 
percentage, it is important to understand how the data visualization used can affect user decisions. 
For example, in a Yale School of Management study looked at perceptions and choices based on 
the visualization of data on restaurant reviews. Even where the mean distribution was lower, 
participants favored a restaurant whose distribution of 1–5 star ratings was top heavy over a 
restaurant with a higher mean score but heavy lower distribution. Visually speaking, the top heavy 
distribution appealed to users despite the lower overall average of the score. Matthew Fisher, 
George E. Newman & Ravi Dhar, Seeing Stars: How the Binary Bias Distorts the Interpretation 
of Customer Ratings, 45 J. OF CONSUMER RES. 471, 474 (2018). When they were given only the 
average score and not a visualization of the underlying data, they chose the one with the higher 
mean. Id. at 479. Thus, a feature like TurboTax’s display of your current refund could ostensibly 
inform one’s decision on how to answer questions in order to attain the maximum refund as 
opposed to the most accurate return. 
281. Data visualization can help increase user confidence in decision making, but whether 
that confidence actually coincides with accuracy is a separate question. Data suggests that 
visualization alone, while increasing confidence, can actually undermine accuracy of decision 
making while visualization combined with the ability to interact with the data can lead to an 
increase of accuracy as well as confidence in the financial context. Fengchun Tang et al., The 
Effects of Visualization and Interactivity on Calibration in Financial Decision-Making, AMCIS 
2011 PROC.—ALL SUBMISSIONS (2011). Confidence is easier to manipulate than accuracy 
meaning that while certain factors may increase a person’s confidence in decision-making, their 
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low credentials should have been offset by many years of experience. Panel 
members would have to determine the adequacy of this part of the AI 
program’s function. 
A third requirement would be that the AI program communicate its 
uncertainty.282 For example, an AI program might generate a novel corporate 
tax minimization plan but alongside it would report the degrees of uncertainty 
on the substantive issues. It would need to highlight any estimations or 
predictions it generated and relied upon, as well as its reliance on legal issues 
for which there is a split among circuits, or disagreement among expert 
commentators, or non-acquiescence by the IRS, or other indicia of 
uncertainty.283 The AI program would need to highlight the weaknesses of its 
analysis so that the professional notices the weaknesses and is better able to 
advise the client. 
A fourth requirement would be that the AI program engage the 
professional. The ideal AI would not function so much as an oracle but as a 
colleague that engages in conversation and argument both learning from and 
teaching the professional.284 The idea that conversation with a computer 
could be equivalent with that of a human has long animated the pursuit of 
AI.285 But, at the least, the AI should include some function to test the 
professional’s understanding of what the AI has suggested. For example, if 
the program has indicated some uncertainty on a substantive issue, does the 
professional understand what that means to the overall plan? By forcing the 
professional to demonstrate his or her own understanding of certain important 
 
accuracy in doing so may remain consistent or even fall even when aided by a computer. Id.; 
Jeffrey E. Kottemann, Fred E. Davis & William E. Remus, Computer-Assisted Decision Making: 
Performance, Beliefs, and the Illusion of Control, 57 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 26, 32–33 (1994). In a study which used XBRL (eXtensible Business 
Reporting Language) to measure the effects of visualization and interaction, it was found that 
either factor alone did not increase accuracy but when combined they did. See Fengchun Tang et 
al., supra note 281 at 5–8. This suggests that in designing a program, the user should be given 
visual representations of the data underlying the output but also the ability to interact with the 
various pieces used to produce the output in order to better develop accuracy. Perhaps the ability 
to see results while choosing pieces to ignore could be a good solution to increase understanding 
on the user’s part and help them better identify things which will increase accuracy in the long 
run. A level of confidence given by the program is simply not a substitute for the user being able 
to dive into key points to understand where the reasoning came from. 
282. Knight, supra note 3. 
283. For a discussion of tax law research and the meaning of non-acquiescence, see 
GIBBERMAN & JOVER-LEDESMA, supra note 134, at Chapter 2. 
284. AI systems may be designed to benefit from interaction with human experts. See 
Karnow, supra note 3, at 174; Rostain, supra note 33, at 562. 
285. Philip Ball, The Truth About the Turing Test, BBC (July 24, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150724-the-problem-with-the-turing-test 
[https://perma.cc/TY43-EJQE]. 
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parts of the plan, if not being technologically enabled to converse with the 
professional about the plan, the program would provide one of the important 
benefits of consulting with human experts: increasing the professional’s own 
expertise and ability to assess and counsel clients on potential risks and 
rewards. 
Fifth, the AI program would need to maintain records of its use so that the 
tax professional could establish good faith use in the event of a penalty 
allegation. Under the Treasury Regulations, the program itself would be 
deemed reliable by its certification but the professional would bear the burden 
of proving good faith use.286 Thus, the need for the AI program to maintain 
records that would enable the professional to prove such use. The program 
would record the facts delivered to it. It would record what the AI provided 
the professional, such as the plan, the facts critical to the plan, and the 
uncertainties of the plan.287 It also would record its interactions with the 
professional, including the degree to which the professional demonstrated his 
or her understanding of the plan.288 The panel would assess the adequacy of 
the program on these points, as well as how easy it would be for the 
professional to access those records, and how the records would be stored.289 
3. Solving the Three Problems 
The solution discourages the development of AI that provides bare 
conclusions. It encourages AI that explains itself and engages with the 
professional with the aim of improving her understanding and increasing her 
expertise and competence. It should improve not only the professional’s 
understanding of the legal and practical issues but the professional’s ability 
to counsel the client. 
The panels of professionals would do what no isolated professional could 
do, which is determine the reliability of AI across many scenarios. No single 
individual will have the time, resources, or incentives to test an AI application 
this way before using it for a particular client. Involving high quality 
professionals in scrutinizing an AI product is the most likely way to 
determine if, as a matter of fact, the AI works as it should. It need not be 
 
286. See supra text accompanying notes 184–86. 
287. See supra text accompanying notes 278–83. 
288. See supra text accompanying notes 284–85. 
289. The storage of the records (e.g., in the cloud) is a practical and technological issue but 
also raises professional responsibility issues if third parties have access to confidential 
information. See, for example, Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Op. 2215 (2012), which describes the 
lawyer’s duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that confidential information stored in the cloud 
remains confidential. 
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infallible, but only a product that a reasonable, competent, diligent 
professional would use. 
The panels of professionals would keep professionalism as the touchstone 
for their assessments. But the panels need the IRS to create the demand for 
their work. The ongoing IRS oversight of professionals who use AI should 
protect the process. But the most important protection would be the work of 
those experts who understand the complexities of law and contemporary 
practices and have a commitment to high standards. The panels will function 
the best to the extent the panelists function like Orthodox Union rabbis whose 
understanding of their law and the complexities of modern food practices is 
joined with such a high commitment that it is not only professional but 
personal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Tax law provides a good case study for encouraging professionally 
responsible AI use. Tax professionals are responsible for divining the line 
between the government’s right to take and the client’s right to keep, giving 
due care not to err. It is a profession with a long history of computerization 
and potential for much more. It is a profession comprised of professionals 
united by a shared expertise and regulator. The technical guidance of its 
shared regulator guides the AI discussion into practicalities and solutions 
rather than the abstractions and distractions that mention of “artificial 
intelligence” often spur. 
Though the solution for tax professionals is technical and specifically for 
them, it illuminates a way forward for other professions. It will be practical 
for third parties (such as government or insurers) to stimulate product demand 
for professionals to use certain types of AI. It will be useful to establish that 
the use of certified AI will protect a professional from sanctions when the 
advice fails. It may be most useful to aim that certification at protecting 
professionals from the malpractice claims related to failed advice. 
In general, these certifications should be provided to AI that augments, 
that is, improves professional intelligence rather than functions as a bare 
substitute for it. Encouraging the development of this type of AI, one that 
functions to educate and develop the professional, increasing his or her 
competence, is key. At some point, given the potential power of AI to 
improve professional judgement, it may become a matter of malpractice for 
a professional not to use it. 
Also key is keeping professionals as the arbiters of what is professional. 
What is professionally responsible is always an issue of the norms of the 
profession. Burdening fellow professionals with the responsibility of 
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certifying professionally appropriate AI creates a space for the professions to 
remain self-regulating, even as they open themselves to the transformations 
AI will bring. 
